Demystifying ADR Neutral Regulation in Minnesota: The Need for Uniformity and Public Trust in the Twenty-First Century ADR System by Gislason, Adam Furlan
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1999
Demystifying ADR Neutral Regulation in
Minnesota: The Need for Uniformity and Public
Trust in the Twenty-First Century ADR System
Adam Furlan Gislason
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gislason, Adam Furlan, "Demystifying ADR Neutral Regulation in Minnesota: The Need for Uniformity and Public Trust in the
Twenty-First Century ADR System" (1999). Minnesota Law Review. 798.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/798
Note
Demystifying ADR Neutral Regulation in Minnesota:
The Need for Uniformity and Public Trust in the
Twenty-First Century ADR System
Adam Furlan Gislason*
In order for ADR to be effective, there must be broad public confidence
in the integrity and fairness of the process.
-Minnesota General Rule of Practice 114'
The "Alternative Dispute Resolution2 movement"3 is being
championed as one of the most important legal progressions the
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. MINN. GEN. R PRAC. 114 app., Code of Ethics, pmbl., para. 3. The Gen-
eral Rules of Practice for the District Courts "apply in all trial courts of the
state." Id. at 1.01.
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is broadly defined as "procedures
for settling disputes by means other than litigation," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
78 (6th ed. 1990), and generally encompasses several distinct processes for
resolving disputes. For example, Minnesota Rule of General Practice 114 di-
vides the ADR processes into four distinct categories: adjudicative processes
(including arbitration, consensual special magistrate, moderated settlement
conference, and summary jury trial); evaluative processes (including early
neutral evaluation (ENE) and neutral factfinding); facilitative processes (me-
diation); and hybrid processes (including mini-trials, mediation-arbitration
(med-arb) and other processes as contracted by the parties). See MINN. GEN.
R. PRAC. 114.02(a) (defining each ADR process).
This Note recognizes that each ADR process invokes dissimilar ethical
expectations and concerns. For example, "[blecause arbitrators, unlike media-
tors, have the power to render a binding decision, concerns about impartiality
or conflicts of interest may be of greater concern in arbitration proceedings
than in mediations." NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 373 (1996); see also Glen Sato,
Comment, The Mediator-Lawyer: Implications for the Practice of Law and One
Argument for Professional Responsibility Guidance-A Proposal for Some
Ethical Considerations, 34 UCLA L. REV. 507, 511 (1986) (discussing the
problematic role of lawyers in mediation). Consequently, it should be under-
stood that for the purposes of this Note, "uniform" rules or standards of ADR
professional conduct do not equate to "identical" rules for mediators and arbi-
trators that should necessarily be applied nationwide, but are rules that apply
to all neutrals practicing within a specific ADR process. Because arbitration
and mediation are the most common forms of ADR, see Harold Brown, Alter-
1839
1840 MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 83:1839
American justice system has encountered and embraced this
century.4 Inarguably, ADR has transformed the modern legal
landscape by offering a more efficient and amicable means of
resolving civil disputes-an attractive alternative to the tradi-
tional adversarial method of public justice.5 The use of ADR is
skyrocketing as we approach the next millennium; more and
more companies and individual consumers are choosing to re-
solve their simple and complex disputes through ADR rather
than litigation.6 State and federal legislatures are fueling the
native Dispute Resolution: Realities and Remedies, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
743, 745 (1997), this Note focuses on the regulation of those two processes, but
contemplates the regulation of ADR neutrals generally.
3. This phrase was, perhaps, first used by Owen M. Fiss and later coined
by Jethro K. Lieberman and James F. Henry. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Set-
tlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073 (1984); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F.
Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 424, 425 (1986). For a general discussion of the recent ADR move-
ment, see STEPHEN B. GOLBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 6-9 (2d ed. 1992).
4. See Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1488 (1994) (comparing
the dramatic effect that ADR has had on the civil justice system to the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938).
5. There is a strong consensus amongst practitioners, judges, and schol-
ars that ADR is more efficient and less expensive than litigation. See, e.g.,
Tom Arnold, Why ADR, in PAT. LITIG. 1996, at 245, 247-66 (agreeing with
former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, who professed, "Our litigation system
is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for a civilized people,"
and arguing as a practicing lawyer and ADR neutral that ADR "save[s] mil-
lions of dollars" and "tons of time"); Lieberman & Henry, supra note 3, at 427
(stating that the litigation process is too "formal, tricky, divisive, time-
consuming, and distorting"). The former Chief Justice of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court, A.M. "Sandy" Keith, recently stated that "[tihe promise of alter-
native dispute resolution techniques is immense. If civil matters can be re-
solved earlier and more cheaply through ADR, we will not only improve the
delivery of legal services for those cases, we will also accelerate the calendar
for those cases that must be resolved using the adversarial process." A.M.
Keith, Commentary, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 1, 3 (1991). Some propo-
nents go so far as to "argue that more efficient justice is better justice."
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatoy Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 489 (1985). For
similar sentiments and arguments, see Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of
Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 571 (1983). The view that
ADR is more efficient and less expensive than litigation has also been empiri-
cally verified. See Rosenberg & Folberg, supra note 4, at 1488-89 (finding that
ENE increases party satisfaction by reducing costs and time to solve dis-
putes); Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact
of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota (Dec. 1997) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
6. See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 3, at 424 (asserting that "[in less
than a decade... [ADR] has grown from a bravely-voiced hope to a congeries
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"movement" by considering and enacting legal reforms specifi-
cally designed to decrease litigation and increase the use of
ADR.7 The ADR "movement" has become a permanent feature
of the American public justice system.8
Notwithstanding its prevalence and prominence, ADR has
its disadvantages.9 Traditionally, critics have been skeptical
and cautious of ADR because it circumvents the procedural
and substantive safeguards of the adversarial public justice
system.10 One of the most important issues and criticisms of
of practices animated by the desire to resolve legal battles outside the court-
room"). The General Accounting Office in 1995 surveyed 2,000 businesses
that employed over 100 employees and found that more than 90% had estab-
lished "some sort of grievance procedure using one or more ADR approaches."
Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of Em-
ployment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 23 (1997) (citing Richard D. Wilkins, Ar-
bitrate or Out!, CENT. N.Y. Bus. J., Feb. 5, 1996, at 1). Recently, Attorney
General Janet Reno announced that more than 170,000 civil cases would be
assigned to private arbitrators by the Justice Department. See id. at 23.
7. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 484.76 subd. 1 (1998) (delegating the author-
ity to establish a statewide ADR program to the Minnesota Supreme Court);
id. § 494.01 subd. 2 (delegating authority to the state court administrator to
administer the Community Dispute Resolution Program); MINN. GEN. R.
PRAC. 114 (instituting rules governing ADR in district courts). See generally
LUCILLE M. PONTE & THOMAS D. CAVENAGH, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS 22 (1999) (noting that some legal reforms are ex-
plicitly designed to increase ADR and decrease litigation).
8. See PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 7, at 323.
9. See generally JOHN W. COOLEY & STEVEN LUBET, ARBITRATION
ADVOCACY 6-9 (1997) (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of arbi-
tration, mediation and court adjudication).
10. See PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 7, at 34-35 (discussing the three
major constitutional criticisms of ADR: lack of due process, public access, and
equal protection). For a general criticism of the ADR process, see Thomas E.
Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70
TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1957-60 (1996), criticizing arbitration for its lack of proce-
dure and as an unsuitable adjudicatory mechanism for every claim. For a
skeptical view of ADR, see Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State
Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 579, 582-85
(1997). Reuben states that "ADR arguably presents one of the greatest chal-
lenges American civil justice has ever encountered." Id. at 582. For judicial
criticisms of ADR, see Justice Douglas's dissent in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 521-34 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting), and Justice Stevens'
dissent in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 640-66 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Harry T. Edwards, Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668,
679 (1986) (arguing that "[ilnexpensive, expeditious, and informal adjudica-
tion is not always synonymous with fair and just adjudication"); Kim Karelis,
Private Justice: How Civil Litigation Is Becoming a Private Institution-The
Rise of Private Dispute Centers, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 621, 622 (1994) (stating
that critics claim that the ADR system "raise[s] the specter of separate and
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ADR is the lack of consistent, reliable, and enforceable stan-
dards of ADR neutral" professional conduct.' 2 Members of the
bench and bar, ADR practitioners, and scholars have taken no-
tice nationwide that the responsibility and accountability of
ADR neutrals is wanting, especially considering the rapid de-
velopment and use of ADR.13 Yet despite this persuasive con-
sensus, it is far from settled as to what the standards of profes-
sional ADR neutral conduct should be and, more importantly,
who has the responsibility and authority to promulgate and en-
force these standards. 4
unequal judicial systems; one for the rich and one for the poor"); Jacqueline
M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients, and Mediation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1369, 1372 (1998) (noting that the "growth of... [the ADR movement, and
mediation in particular, is slowly transforming the practice of law, but little
attention has been paid to the normative questions of how that transforma-
tion should take place."). For a lengthy criticism of settlements in general,
see Fiss, supra note 3, at 1075, arguing that settlement practices are compa-
rable to plea bargains and should therefore not be institutionalized because
justice is thwarted.
11. An ADR neutral is defined as "an individual or organization who pro-
vides an ADR process." MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.02(b). Rule 114 distin-
guishes "qualified neutrals" from other neutrals, defining a qualified neutral
as "an individual or organization included on the State Court Administrator's
roster." Id.
12. One critic noted that "[an ethics code for ADR neutrals is at the top
of the agenda in Minnesota" and in many other jurisdictions around the coun-
try. Duane W. Krohnke, Do No Evil-ADR Ethics, in MINNESOTA ADR
DESKBOOK § 4.2 (Gary A. Weissman ed., 1998); see also STEPHEN B.
GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 490 (1985) (stating that ADR has
been criticized because the process is "inherently imprecise and subject to
manipulation"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Re-
sponsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 408-09 (1997) (stating that "[t]he ro-
mantic days of ADR appear to be over," as ADR presents new ethical
dilemmas for attorney and non-attorney-neutrals which cannot be solved by
the existing rules governing lawyer conduct); Symposium, Standards of Pro-
fessional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 95,
98 (1995) (noting that standards of professional conduct for ADR neutrals "is a
hot topic in the world of ADR today"). For a general but extensive discussion
by several ADR experts regarding the regulation of ADR neutrals and stan-
dards of ADR professional conduct, see id.
13. See PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 7, at 323 (noting that "because
ADR is relatively new, it is still a largely unregulated field); John D. Feerick,
Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 79 JUDICATURE 314, 314-15 (1996) (dis-
cussing the development of broad and flexible standards for mediators); Kim-
berlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's
Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 71, 88 (1998) (noting the need for na-
tional regulation).
14. See Kirnberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Rec-
ommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 587, 620 (1997)
[Vol. 83:18391842
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The uniform regulation of ADR neutrals presents several
dilemmas. Foremost, ADR is uniquely interdisciplinary and
interprofessional-lawyers, psychologists, architects, account-
ants, and many other professionals (and non-professionals)
practice as ADR neutrals in a variety of ADR forums. 15 Thus
some ADR neutrals remain subject to dissimilar standards of
conduct established by their professions.1 6 Additionally, neu-
trals perform distinctive roles as neutrals, raising unique and
distinct issues of professional conduct.'7 Consequently, ADR
pundits question and doubt whether ADR neutrals are ade-
quately regulated by the various state boards and private or-
ganizations that govern the individual occupations, and
whether neutrals should be treated as members of a distinct
profession with its own professional standards of conduct.18
(acknowledging that the issue of who should regulate ADR neutrals is pres-
ently confronting many state governments and proposing that a good faith re-
quirement in ADR should be enacted by legislation, a code of ethics, or court
rule); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its
Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1911-22
(1997) (discussing what the ethical standards in ADR should be and how it
should be regulated). Several state courts have recently addressed the ques-
tion of who should regulate ADR neutrals in an attempt to bring some sem-
blance of uniformity into the jurisdiction. See, e.g., FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED &
COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS Rule 10 (1998) (establishing the rules for certi-
fied and court-appointed mediators); UTAH R. OF COURT-ANNEXED
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION Rules 101-04, Canons I-yIn (1998) (de-
fining the standards of ethical conduct for court-appointed arbitrators and
mediators).
15. Throughout the United States an assorted group of professionals
practice as ADR neutrals in a variety of ADR forums. See Loretta W. Moore,
Lawyer Mediators: Meeting the Ethical Challenges, 30 FAM. L.Q. 679, 680
(1996); Symposium, supra note 12, at 95.
16. See discussion infra Part I.D.
17. ADR neutrals have special ethical demands because they must honor
and abide by policies such as impartiality, confidentiality, and respect for
party autonomy, qualities which most professional codes do not contemplate
or enforce. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass
Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1161 (1995)
(noting that transsubstantive ethics are presently ineffective in today's com-
plex litigation and therefore the system requires more precise standards);
Symposium, supra note 12, at 95-96. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 12.
18. See Symposium, supra note 12, at 95-96 (noting the consensus that
the ethics codes of individual professions do not contemplate ADR ethics, and
that because ADR neutrals "view themselves as a part of a distinct profes-
sion," an interdisciplinary code of conduct should be promulgated to apply to
all neutrals); see also JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., MEDIATION AND OTHER NON-
BINDING ADR PROCESSES 203-04 (1996); Kovach & Love, supra note 13, at 87
(stating that "disparate state regulation has caused confusion about the
18431999]
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These issues pose significant challenges to state governments,
which have labored for years with the difficulty of developing
and maintaining ethical standards for professionals and public
officials. 19
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court took the first ma-
jor step toward broader regulation of ADR neutrals in Minne-
sota2o by promulgating the Code of Ethics,21 which prescribes
standards of ADR neutral conduct to all neutrals practicing
court-annexed ADR,22 regardless of their professional back-
grounds.23 Notwithstanding its value, the rapid growth of ADR
meaning of 'mediation" and dilutes the advantages of mediation in general);
Moore, supra note 15, at 680 (acknowledging that because mediators "do not
share a common ethical background, there have been problems developing a
comprehensive set of standards which apply to all mediators").
In response to the need for uniform standards of ADR neutral conduct,
several ADR organizations have promulgated "codes" for ADR neutrals. See
American Arbitration Association, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Com-
mercial Disputes, reprinted in AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ET AL.,
ADR & THE LAW 557-67 (1997); American Arbitration Association, Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators, reprinted in AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION ET AL., supra, at 568-74; American Arbitration Association, Con-
struction Industry Dispute Resolution Procedures (1997), reprinted in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, WHAT THE BUSINESS LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW
ABOUT ADR 245-93 (William L.D. Barrett ed., 1998). The AAA, ABA, and the
Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) recently formed a
Joint Committee on Standards of Conduct, and in 1994 issued The Standards
of Conduct for Mediators. See Symposium, supra note 12, at 96 & app. at 122
(reprinting the Standards).
19. See Brown, supra note 2, at 784 (suggesting that the state legislatures
should consider licensing ADR neutrals as a profession, and also suggesting
that ADR neutrals should be personally liable for violations of ethical stan-
dards); Samuel D. Zurier, Rhode Island's Ethical Laws: Constitutional and
Policy Issues, R.I. B.J., June-July 1996, at 9 (noting that state governments
have had difficulty in "maintaining high ethical standards for public offi-
cials"); cf John Q. Barrett, A Post-Conference Reflection on Separate Ethical
Aspirations for ADR's Not-So-Separate Practitioners, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 705,
710-11 (1997) (arguing that uniform standards of ethics for ADR neutrals
would be futile because they are not necessary and would "chill the develop-
ment of creative new ADR approaches or drive practitioners who are inter-
ested in those approaches out of the legal profession").
20. See MINNESOTA ADR DESKBOOK § 1.1(C)-(D) (Gary A. Weissman ed.,
1998).
21. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app.
22. "Court-annexed ADR" generally refers to court-supervised ADR proc-
esses where the judiciary has established rules and standards governing the
processes. See, e.g., id. For a general discussion regarding court-annexed ar-
bitration, see PONTE & CANVENAGH, supra note 7, at 188.
23. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., Code of Ethics, pmbl., para. 2
(stating that "[ilndividuals and organizations approved by the ADR Review
Board consent to the jurisdiction of the Board and to compliance with this
1844 [Vol. 83:1839
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coupled with the problem of copious and disordered legislative,
judicial, and private rules and standards of conduct governing
neutrals24 ultimately proves the Code of Ethics inadequate,
thereby reinforcing the need for uniform and universal ADR
neutral regulation and accountability. This need, however,
presents several political, statutory, and philosophical obsta-
cles, including unique issues revolving around the separation
of powers doctrine.25 Hence, the Minnesota Supreme Court is
seeking guidance as it ponders the future of the Code of Ethics
and the regulation of ADR neutrals in general. Several ques-
tions are being raised, including to whom and in what par-
ticular circumstances does the Code of Ethics apply. Are ADR
neutrals bound to other professional ethical codes of conduct
beyond the Code of Ethics in Rule 114? What agency and what
procedures will be used for enforcement of any ADR Code of
Ethics? And if the Code of Ethics is ultimately inadequate,
what actions should be taken, and who should take them, to
protect the public from ADR neutral misconduct?2 6
This Note attempts to answer these questions and argues
that it is in the best interest of the consuming public and the
rapidly evolving ADR system that the Minnesota Legislature,
the Executive Branch, and the Minnesota Supreme Court work
cooperatively towards establishing an exclusive Board of Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution to undertake the responsibility of
regulating all ADR neutrals under universal and uniform rules
of ADR professional conduct. Part I of this Note recounts and
analyzes the existing disciplinary standards and regulatory
mechanisms under statutory law, common law, and the disor-
dered professional standards of conduct governing ADR neu-
trals. Part H critically analyzes the newly promulgated Code
of Ethics under Rule 114 that serves as an aspirational guide
for ADR neutrals participating in court-annexed ADR. Part III
argues that universal and uniform rules of ADR professional
Code of Ethics").
24. See Kovach & Love, supra note 13, at 87-88 (regarding the disadvan-
tages of "disparate state regulation"); see also discussion infra Parts I-H.
25. See discussion infra Parts Il.A-C.
26. See ADR Review Board, Report on Implementation of Rule 114, at 11-
23 (July 17, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter
ADR Review Board Report] (containing various recommendations to unan-
swered questions); Daniel A. Gislason & Dustan J. Cross, Code of Ethics: Rule
114 General Rules of Practice (1997) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (noting several outstanding issues regarding ADR regulation under
the Code of Ethics).
1999] 1845
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conduct are desirable because they will engender public trust
in the ADR system, which is necessary for ADR to be both fair
and successful. Until uniform and universal standards of ADR
professional conduct are promulgated, the jurisdictional ambi-
guity and inadequacies of the varying professional standards
and enforcement mechanisms of ADR professional conduct will
continue to confuse the public, the neutrals, and the state gov-
ernment.
I. OUT OF CONTROL--WHO IS PROTECTING THE
PUBLIC FROM ADR NEUTRAL MISCONDUCT?
The settlement process is not some marginal, peripheral aspect of le-
gal disputing in America; it is the central core.
-Marc Galanter 27
Solving civil disputes outside the confines of the courtroom
and beyond the bondage of barristers is by no means a modern
phenomenon.28 For centuries, private and public parties have
voluntarily agreed either before or after their dispute to resolve
their grievances through some form of arbitration or mediation
that did not involve the courts.29 But'the judiciary tradition-
ally suppressed the development of private and public ADR by
steadfastly refusing to enforce ADR agreements. 30 Today, how-
ever, the efficacy of ADR is reflected by the support it has re-
ceived from Congress through the enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).31 Further support is evident from the
27. Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation To Teach About
Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 269 (1984).
28. Although the phrase "alternative dispute resolution" is relatively new
to the legal system, settling disputes through third-party neutrals is not. In
fact, "[tihe Magna Carta itself was a truce mediated at Runnymede, in 1215,
between King John and the English barons, by Stephen Langton, the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury." MINNESOTA ADR DESKBOOK, supra note 20, § 1.1(A)
(citing L. WRIGHT, MAGNA CARTA AND THE TRADITION OF LIBERTY 32-35
(1976)).
29. See COOLEY & LUBET, supra note 9, at 15 (commenting generally on
the history of arbitration in the United States); Kovach & Love, supra note 13,
at 88 (commenting on the history of ADR and citing CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE,
THE MEDIATION PROCESS 19-24 (1996), which traces the history of mediation
and arbitration from Biblical references to the modern era).
30. See JOHN S. MuRRAY ET AL., ARBITRATION 53-54 (1996) (noting the
common law "hostility" towards arbitration agreements); Reuben, supra note
10, at 599-601.
31. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (proclaiming that arbitration agreements are valid
contracts between parties lawfully exercising their contractual rights). Con-
gress has also encouraged the use of ADR in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Ameri-
1846 [Vol. 83:1839
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Supreme Court of the United States32 and the fifty states that
have enacted ADR statutes33 empowering the courts to estab-
lish ADR procedures and establishing ADR grievance proce-
dures in government agencies and programs. 34 Many critics
insist however, that we should be somewhat disturbed when
private agreements begin to replace traditional, democratic
adjudication35 with all of its procedural and substantive safe-
cans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), stating "Where appropriate and to
the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolu-
tion, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
factfinding, mini-trials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes
arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title." 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); see also Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471
(1994) (permitting federal district courts to settle disputes through a civil jus-
tice expense and delay reduction plan).
32. A trio of cases referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy reflected the
dramatic change in the Supreme Court's attitude towards arbitration-from
utter hostility to uncompromising support. See United Steelworkers of Am. v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). This judicial support
continues today. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20 (1991) (upholding the mandatory arbitration of a claim under the ADEA
and asserting that pursuant to the will of Congress, as embodied in the FAA,
the judiciary should no longer be skeptical and hostile towards private arbi-
tration agreements). For an exhaustive discussion regarding the Supreme
Court's decisions supporting ADR, see Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration
and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. DISP.
RESOL. 231 (1990).
33. See infra notes 47,49 and accompanying text.
34. Compare MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 with FLA. R. FOR CERTIFIED &
COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS 10. A vast majority of the federal district
courts have also established ADR programs pursuant to the Civil Justice Re-
form Act of 1990. See John D. Feerick, Toward Uniform Standards of Con-
duct for Mediators, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 456 (1997) (noting that eighty out
of ninety-four district courts have implemented ADR programs). President
Clinton recently signed the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, which will
greatly expand the use of ADR in federal courts. See Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998, H.R. 3528, 105th Cong. (1998) (creating ADR pro-
grams in all federal district courts). For more information on the federal leg-
islation, see R. Larson Frisby, A Major Step: Expansion of Federal Court ADR
Tops Action by 105th Congress, 5 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 30, 30 (1998). See also
Duane W. Krohnke & Janice K. Frankman, ADR Ethics-The New Code and
Beyond (Nov. 6, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
35. See COOLEY & LUBET, supra note 9, at 6-7; Reuben, supra note 10, at
583-84 (noting that ADR has essentially replaced public litigation in the secu-
rities industry as the primary means of resolving disputes and that ADR is
encroaching rapidly in the construction, domestic relations, and medical mal-
practice settings). For excellent arguments supporting the replacement of the
adversary system with alternative dispute resolution, see generally Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
18471999]
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guards, 36 because "public fairness values require safeguards."
37
In light of that concern, the regulation of ADR systems and
neutrals is a significant issue, and although many critics be-
lieve that uniform standards are desirable, the more important
issue is whether a uniform code can be achieved.38
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996) (arguing that episte-
mologically, structurally, remedially, and behaviorally, the adversary system
is an inadequate method of achieving the essential goals of a dispute resolu-
tion system, and that the experimentation with ADR and other methods of
solving disputes reflects society's disappointment with the adversary model).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person shall be "deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); id. amend. XIV, § 1
(no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws"); id. amend. VII (providing the right to a jury trial).
37. See Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for
Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 520 (1991) (arguing
that the standards of professional conduct should be higher for mediators
than they currently are today because the mediator distributes or facilitates
private justice).
38. See Paul F. Devine, Mediator Qualifications: Are Ethical Standards
Enough To Protect the Client?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 187, 197-207
(1993); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 421. This Note anticipates the
primary criticism that neutrals should not be formally regulated with licen-
sure and standards of ADR professional conduct because there is no present
need, as demonstrated by the fact that the public is not filing complaints with
any professional board against ADR neutrals-i.e., that the market seems to
adequately regulate ADR neutral misconduct. See Telephone Interview with
Kent J. Wagner, Associate of Minnesota Supreme Court Office of Continuing
Education, Minnesota Supreme Court (Oct. 6, 1998) (noting the scarcity of
complaints received against "qualified neutrals"); Telephone Interview with
Chad Wagner, Investigator of Minnesota Board of Psychology (Feb. 24, 1999)
(stating that to the best of his knowledge, the Minnesota Board of Psychology
has not received any complaints regarding a licensed psychologist's miscon-
duct as an ADR neutral). Admittedly, the regulation of ADR neutrals and
ADR processes may be disadvantageous because "[ilt might limit the field, sti-
fle innovation and debate, and short-circuit useful experimentation and plu-
ralism." Kovach & Love, supra note 13, at 87-88 (discussing the dangers of
uniform regulation of ADR neutrals). Moreover, uniform regulation might
stifle and control the ADR processes to the point, for example, that it is "re-
pugnant to the fundamental goal of mediation-voluntary self-determination
by parties." Id. at 88. See generally FLORENCE HEFFEON & NEIL MCFEELEY,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY PROCESS 347-71 (1983) (discussing the
economic, political and social consequences of governmental regulation in
general). Nevertheless, while a comprehensive defense against these argu-
ments is beyond the scope of this Note, the public's silence on the matter
should not be surprising considering the "relative infancy of... [ADRI and the
lack of a set of standards" regulating ADR neutral conduct. Devine, supra, at
197. Moreover, no board or body has been established to receive and investi-
gate public complaints against ADR neutrals. In fact, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has yet to establish a body to whom complaints under the Code of Eth-
ics may be brought and with whom disciplinary actions may be taken. See
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Presently, numerous sources provide the "safeguards"
against ADR neutral misconduct, including federal and state
statutes, common law, court-promulgated standards of ethics,
occupational standards of conduct, and standards established
by private ADR organizations.39 However, a close examination
of these dissimilar and discombobulated standards reveals that
these "safeguards" are merely illusory-necessitating universal
and uniform regulation of ADR neutrals.
A. STATUTORY CONTROL: FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT,
MINNESOTA UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, AND THE
MINNESOTA CIVIL MEDIATION ACT
The enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925
shook not only the pillars of the Supreme Court of the United
States, but also the very foundation of our adversarial system
of justice.40 Historically, the courts criticized and chastised ar-
bitration for its unconventional processes. 41 The enactment of
the FAA, however, forced the courts to reexamine their stance
by making arbitration agreements in maritime transactions
and in contracts involving interstate commerce "valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable, save upon grounds as exist at law or
equity for the revocation of any contract."42 Moreover, the FAA
further authorized the courts to compel a party to arbitration if
one of the parties to an arbitration agreement subsequently re-
fuses and to stay court proceedings where there is a valid arbi-
tration agreement,43 a mandate that initially received harsh
criticism and disavowal from the courts. Although the FAA
ADR Review Board Report, supra note 26, at 16; Telephone Interview with
Kent J. Wagner, supra (noting the lack of an enforcement mechanism under
the Code of Ethics).
39. See discussion infra Parts I-H.
40. For an extended narration of the Court's historical abhorrence of arbi-
tration and mediation, see Reuben, supra note 10, at 598-601.
41. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
42. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 273-74, 281 (1994) (holding that the definition of "involving" com-
merce is the "functional equivalent of 'affecting" commerce, and that an arbi-
tration agreement is within the FAA if it involves commerce even if the par-
ties never intended an interstate commerce connection). Federal law
determines the validity of arbitration because the FAA preempts conflicting
state law if the arbitration agreement involves interstate commerce agree-
ments. See Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 467 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir.
1972); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409 (2d
Cir. 1991).
43. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4.
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does not compel parties to arbitrate unless they have expressly
and voluntarily agreed to do so, the provisions of the FAA
manifest a liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration agree-
ments.44 The FAA requires the federal courts to enforce arbi-
tration agreements according to their terms as if they were
traditional contracts, thus overruling the judiciary's perpetual
refusal to do so under the common law.45 The FAA also pre-
empts any conflicting state laws that require a judicial forum
and deny the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 4 6
Today, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
enacted arbitration statutes generally modeled after the Uni-
form Arbitration Act (UAA).47 These statutes govern arbitra-
tion agreements and proceedings outside the scope of the
FAA.48 In Minnesota, arbitration agreements are governed by
the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA).49 Under this
44. See id.; Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stan-
ford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474-78 (1989) (noting that although the "FAA
does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute at any time," the
Act "was designed to overrule the Judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce
agreements to arbitrate" and "to encourage the expeditious resolution of dis-
putes"); see also PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 7, at 158 (noting that the
FAA "promoted the use of arbitration to resolve conflicts in commercial trans-
actions" by providing "parties with the opportunity to resolve their disputes
through arbitration rather than the courts").
45. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co, 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (stating
that the purpose of the FAA was to "revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements ... to allow parties to avoid 'the costliness and delays
of litigation,' and to place arbitration agreements 'upon the same footing as
other contracts') (citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)).
46. See Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 803 (Minn. 1995)
(holding that the FAA supersedes any conflicting state law to the extent that
the state law denies the enforceability of arbitration agreements and requires
a judicial forum).
47. See Reuben, supra note 10, at 596 n.60 (listing all of the state statutes
adopting the UAA); MURRAY ET AL., supra note 30, at 54-55 (discussing the
states' adoption of the UAA).
48. See Thayer v. American Fin. Advisers, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599, 603
(Minn. 1982) (finding that there is no evidence of Congress's intent "to pre-
empt state regulation of arbitration agreements that are part of contracts in-
volving interstate commerce").
49. See MINN. STAT. §§ 572.08-.30 (1998). Minnesota was the first state
to adopt the Uniform Arbitration Act, which was sponsored by the Minnesota
Bar Association. See Maynard E. Pirsig, The Minnesota Uniform Arbitration
Act and the Lincoln Mills Case, 42 MINN. L. REV. 333 (1958). One of the fun-
damental objectives of the MUAA is to encourage and facilitate settlement
disputes by providing a speedy, informal, and relatively inexpensive proce-
dure for resolving controversies arising out of commercial transactions. See
Eric A. Carlstrom Const. Co. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 77, 256 N.W.2d
479, 483 (Minn. 1977). Although resort to the court system is authorized, the
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Act agreements to arbitrate are generally enforceable, and
more importantly, irrevocable.5 0 The MUAA was enacted by
the Minnesota legislature in 195751 to effectuate the general
public policy favoring arbitration.52 The statutory scheme of
the MIUAA is similar to the FAA; each contains specific provi-
sions regarding the validity and enforceability of arbitration
agreements;53 the court procedures to compel or stay arbitra-
tion;54 procedures governing the arbitration hearing;55 provi-
sions for wituesses, subpoenas, and depositions;56 standards
and guidelines for arbitration awards;5 7 and procedures for ob-
taining judicial relief from invalid arbitration awards. 58
The FAA and MIUAA only apply to arbitration proceedings
and agreements; they do not apply to other ADR processes,
specifically mediation proceedings. In Minnesota, mediation
proceedings are governed by the Minnesota Civil Mediation Act
(MCMA).59 Similarly, mediation agreements are "determined
under principles of law applicable to contract."60 As such,
basic intent of the MUAA is "to discourage litigation and to foster voluntary
resolution of disputes in a forum created and controlled by the written agree-
ment of the contracting parties." Id.
50. See MINN. STAT. § 572.08 (stating that arbitration agreements are
"valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract").
51. Minnesota demonstrated "its leadership in progressive legislation" by
being the first state to adopt the UAA. Pirsig, supra note 49, at 333. Nearly
all fifty states today have enacted arbitration statutes identical or similar to
the UAA. See PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 7, at 158-59. For a general
discussion regarding the historical enactment and applicability of the MUAA
and the UAA, see Pirsig, supra note 49.
52. For a detailed comparison of the FAA and the UAA, see Joseph Cola-
giovanni & Thomas W. Hartmann, Enforcing Arbitration Awards, 50 DISP.
RESOL. J. 14 (1995).
53. Compare MINN. STAT. § 572.08 with Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1994).
54. Compare MINN. STAT. § 572.09 with 9 U.S.C. § 3.
55. Compare MINN. STAT. §§ 572.12-.14 with 9 U.S.C. § 7.
56. See MINN. STAT. § 572.12.
57. Compare id. §§ 572.15-.16 with 9 U.S.C. § 9.
58. Compare MINN. STAT. §§ 572.18-.20 with 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-13, 16.
59. MINN. STAT. §§ 572.31-.40.
60. Id. § 572.35. Under the MUAA, the mediation agreement is not
binding on either of the parties and can not be enforced by the courts unless
the written agreement contains provisions "stating that it is binding" and
stating
that (a) the mediator has no duty to protect their interests or provide
them with information about their legal rights; (b) signing a mediated
settlement agreement may adversely affect their legal rights; and (c)
they should consult an attorney before signing a mediated settlement
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agreements to mediate6' and mediated settlement agreements62
must be in writing.6 3
Notwithstanding the detailed provisions of both the MUAA
and MCMA, these acts fail to define and prescribe with any de-
tail the standards of professional conduct and ethical responsi-
bility expected and required by neutrals conducting an ADR
process governed by these acts. Although the MUAA and
MCMA obligate the neutral to follow certain procedures in or-
der to qualify the process and bring about a legally enforceable
outcome, the references to ethical responsibilities of the neu-
tral are sparse and ill-defined. For example, under the MUAA,
a "neutral arbitrator"64 must "disclose any relationships the
person has with any of the parties, their counsel, insurers, or
representatives and any conflict of interest, or potential conflict
of interest, the person may have."65 Similarly, an arbitration
award may be vacated if the neutral arbitrator fails to disclose
agreement if they are uncertain of their rights.
Id.
61. Under the MCMA, an "agreement to mediate" is a
written agreement which identifies a controversy between the parties
to the agreement, states that the parties will seek to resolve the con-
troversy through mediation, provides for termination of mediation
upon written notice from either party or the mediator delivered by
certified mail or personally to the other people who signed the
agreement, is signed by the parties and mediator and is dated.
Id. § 572.33 subd. 3.
62. Under the MCMA, a "mediated settlement agreement" is "a written
agreement setting out the terms of a partial or complete settlement of a con-
troversy identified in an agreement to mediate, signed by the parties, and
dated." Id. § 572.33 subd. 4.
63. See id. In a controversial and somewhat landmark case for Minnesota
ADR law, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to honor and enforce a
handwritten mediated settlement agreement on the grounds that it did not
contain a provision stating that the agreement was binding, effectively hold-
ing that the courts will not enforce a mediated settlement agreement unless it
complies strictly with the express provisions of the MCMA. See Haghighi v.
Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 577 N.W.2d 927, 930 (Minn. 1998) (en banc).
64. A neutral arbitrator is defined as "the only arbitrator in a case or is
one appointed by the court, by the other arbitrators, or by all parties together
in agreement. A neutral arbitrator does not include one selected by fewer
than all parties even though no other party objects." MINN. STAT. § 572.10
subd. 2.
65. Id. § 572.10 subd. 2(b). The MUAA further states that "after a neu-
tral arbitrator has been selected, any relationship, conflict of interest, or po-
tential conflict of interest that arises must be immediately disclosed by the
arbitrator in writing to all parties, and a party may move the district court or
the arbitration tribunal for removal of the neutral arbitrator." Id. § 572.10(c)(1).
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any conflict of interest;66 "the award was procured by corrup-
tion, fraud, or other undue means;"67 the arbitrator was evi-
dently partial;68 or the arbitrator exceeded her power.
6 9 Com-
paratively, under the MCMA, a compensated mediator must
only provide the parties a written statement prior to the me-
diation in which the neutral "shall describe [the neutral's] edu-
cational background and relevant training and expertise in the
66. The MUAA provides that the arbitration award may be vacated for
fraud "if the neutral arbitrator fails to disclose a conflict of interest or mate-
rial relationship." Id. § 572.10(3). In applying this provision, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals has held that the court will not vacate an arbitration award
unless the injured party establishes "evident partiality" under the UAA. See
Ronning v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 557 N.W.2d 363, 366-67 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (refusing to adopt a per se rule entitling a party to have an arbi-
trator's award vacated if the arbitrator fails to disclose a prior relationship
with a party regardless of any showing of prejudice). That being said, "evi-
dent partiality" is not equivalent to "actual bias." See Pirsig v. Pleasant
Mound Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 512 N.W.2d 342, 342-44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that evident partiality is a question of law which the courts shall re-
view de novo).
67. MINN. STAT. § 572.19 subd. 1(1).
68. Id. § 572.19 subd. 2. Central to any ADR process is the impartiality of
the ADR neutral. Essentially, any code of conduct at the very least must cau-
tion the neutrals and give the parties some assurance that an ADR neutral
shall remain "neutral" and should not show any favoritism or bias. In this
sense, the neutral acts in a capacity completely dissimilar from that of an ad-
vocate as contemplated in the varying lawyers' professional standards. Re-
cently, a circuit court has entertained the argument that arbitration awards
should be vacated on the grounds of "evident partiality" of the arbitrator when
the arbitrator fails to disclose that his former law firm represented one of the
disputants in a previous related matter. See A1-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85
F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996). However, the court stated that "the burden on the
claimant for vacation of an arbitration award due to 'evident partiality' is
heavy, and the claimant must establish specific facts that indicate improper
motives on the part of an arbitrator.' Id. at 683 (quoting Peoples Sec. Life
Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993)). Fur-
thermore, the court decreed that an award will not be vacated if the arbitrator
does not adequately investigate and subsequently disclose any facts margin-
ally discloseable under Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casu-
alty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); moreover, the court announced that the arbitra-
tor does not have an affirmative duty to conduct such an investigation. See id.
at 683. The Minnesota Supreme Court has also stated that arbitration
awards may be vacated under the MUAA where ex parte contacts between the
neutral and a party to the ADR process at issue create an impression of possi-
ble bias, for example where an arbitrator and a party, or an arbitrator and
members of the arbitration panel, engage in ex parte contact. See Northwest
Mechanical, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 283 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. 1979); Pirsig,
512 N.W.2d at 344 ("A party to an arbitration is entitled to a fair arbitration.
It is not enough that the arbitrators be unbiased; they must not even appear
to be biased.").
69. See MINN. STAT. § 572.19 subd. 1(3).
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field."7 0 If the mediator fails to do so, the mediator is guilty of a
petty misdemeanor.71 Additionally, the courts will only set
aside a mediated settlement agreement "if there was evident
partiality, corruption, or misconduct by a mediator prejudicing
the rights of a party."72 But other than setting aside or vacat-
ing mediated agreements or arbitration awards, the courts are
powerless under the statutes to discipline neutrals who violate
these provisions (save a small fine if the mediator fails to pro-
vide the parties with a statement of qualifications).73
Complicating this matter further, courts generally hesitate
to vacate arbitration and mediation agreements, rendering the
neutral relatively autonomous and unaccountable.7 4 This is
especially troubling considering the statutory or common law
civil immunity that the neutrals enjoy.75 Generally, courts
have been steadfastly obstinate in holding that neutrals (his-
torically arbitrators but more recently mediators) are immune
from civil liability, sometimes as prescribed under the existing
statutes7 6 or under the proposition of quasi-judicial common
law immunity.77 Although the courts have stated that arbitra-
70. Id. § 572.37 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the MCMA provides
that "nothing in this section shall limit the pursuits of professionals consistent
with their training and code of ethics," id., raising the question whether pro-
fessionals will be held to a higher standard under their codes of ethics or
whether this provision simply specifies that any professional is permitted to
mediate so long as it is not forbidden by their applicable codes of ethics or
training. This Note demonstrates, however, that the professional codes of
conduct for all occupations do not apply to a professional practicing as a neu-
tral, or at the very least, are inadequate if applied to a neutral. See discussion
infra Part II.D.
71. See MINN. STAT. § 572.37.
72. Id. § 572.36.
73. See id. § 572.37.
74. "The conventional wisdom is that successful challenges to arbitration
awards are rare." MURRAY ET AL., supra note 30, at 125; Stephen J. Ware, De-
fault Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83
MINN. L. REV. 703, 722 (1999); see also City of Minneapolis v. Police Officers'
Fed'n, 566 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Ehlert v. Western Nat'l
Mut. Ins. Co., 207 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Minn. 1973)) (arguing that arbitration
agreements are favored at law and will be enforced).
75. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 583.26 subd. 7 (granting mediators immunity
"from civil liability for actions within the scope of the position as mediator");
see also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
77. The immunity of arbitrators "rests upon considerations of public pol-
icy.... Arbitrators must be protected from the harassment of personal suits
brought against them by dissatisfied parties so that, like judges, they are able
to 'act upon their convictions free from the apprehensions of possible conse-
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tors enjoy immunity from civil suits for failing to disclose con-
flicts of interests, arbitrators are not insulated from criminal
liability for fraud, corruption, or other sanctions established by
the arbitrator's governing body.7 8 The Minnesota courts, how-
ever, have yet to hold a neutral liable under these standards.
7 9
quences.' L&H Airco, Inc. v. Rapistan Corp., 446 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn.
1989) (quoting Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 72 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Minn. 1955)
(noting the policy of protecting the independence of the arbitration process by
failing to hold an arbitrator liable for failing to disclose prior business or social
contacts)); see also Tindell v. Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn. 1988)
(extending quasi-judicial immunity to guardians ad litem); Stewart v. Case, 54
N.W. 938, 939 (Minn. 1893) (extending quasi-judicial immunity to assessors).
The specific facts and holding in L & H Airco are worth mentioning. In that
case, the aggrieved party made several claims against both the arbitrator and
the attorney for the adversary for failing to disclose their prior business and
social contacts. See L&H Airco, 446 N.W.2d at 375. The court eventually
dismissed the claims of negligent misrepresentation based on arbitrator im-
munity and, in the case of the adversarial attorney, based on the fact that he
did not owe a duty to his client's adversary. See id. at 376-78.
The common law immunity enjoyed by arbitrators and other ADR neu-
trals has recently been codified by the Minnesota Legislature:
A person presiding at an alternative dispute resolution proceeding is
not subject to civil liability for the person's conduct in presiding over
the proceeding, except for injury caused by malice, bad faith, or
reckless conduct. This section does not restrict or affect immunity
from liability that may be available under other law.
MINN. STAT. § 604A.32. To date, this statute has yet to be applied or inter-
preted by the Minnesota Supreme Court; therefore, it is difficult to predict
exactly what types of ADR neutral misconduct violate the ADR immunity
statute. See Kari v. City of Maplewood, 582 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn. 1998)
(defining "malice" in the official immunity context as "'the intentional doing of
a wrongful act without legal justification or excuse, or, otherwise stated, the
willful violation of a known right) (quoting Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100,
107 (Minn. 1991)); Sterling Capital Advisors, Inc. v. Herzog, 575 N.W.2d 121,
125 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (defining "bad faith" as "a party's refusal to fulfill
some duty or contractual obligation based on an ulterior motive, not an honest
mistake regarding one's rights or duties"). The Minnesota Supreme Court has
set forth the following definition of "recklessness:"
A person acts "recklessly" when he consciously disregards a substan-
tial and unjustifiable risk that the element of an offense exists or will
result from his conduct; the risk must be of such a nature and degree
that its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situa-
tion.
State v. Zupetz, 322 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1982). Compare TEX. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 154.055 (West 1997), with MINN. STAT. § 604A.32 (1998).
78. See L&H Airco, 446 N.W.2d at 377-78 (citing Earle v. Johnson, 84
N.W. 332, 333 (1900)).
79. A Westlaw search of Minnesota caselaw and other regional reporters
located one case in which an ADR neutral was sued for malpractice on the
theory of professional negligence, not for breach of any professional standard
of conduct. See Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
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Thus, other than vacating the arbitration award or mediation
agreements, the statutes and the cases applying them provide
little if any protection for the ADR participants and set forth
no disciplinary procedures or sanctions to deter or punish neu-
tral misconduct.
B. STATUTORY SUPPORT OF ADR IN MINNESOTA
"Although its destination is not yet marked, ADR's path
keeps widening 80 and it is increasingly apparent that Minne-
sota is one of the states blazing the modern ADR trail.81 For
example, the State of Minnesota has established the Bureau of
Mediation Services 82 to provide dispute resolution services, in-
cluding arbitration and mediation, to governmental agencies in
public policy disputes 83 and has institutionalized ADR proc-
esses in disputes arising under several statutes, including the
Minnesota Labor Relations Act (MILRA)84 and the Farmer-
Lender Mediation Act (FLMA).85 Despite these achievements,
however, the ethical controls over ADR neutrals practicing un-
(holding that even if Marshall, the attorney-neutral, was negligent, negligence
was not the proximate cause of any damage suffered by the plaintiff).
80. MINNESOTAADRDESKBOOK, supra note 20, § 1.11.
81. See Kovach & Love, supra note 13, at 84-88 (comparing Minnesota's
court-annexed ADR rules to other states'); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at
1911 (noting Minnesota as one of the few states that have promulgated trans-
disciplinary ethical standards for ADR neutrals).
82. See MINN. STAT. § 179.02 (1998) (establishing Bureau of Mediation
Services (BMS)); MINN. R. 5520.0100-.0800, 5530.0100-.1200 (1997) (defining
the BMS and enumerating its powers, procedures, and policies). The Minne-
sota Legislature first established the Division of Conciliation, the predecessor
of the BMS, to administer the MLIRA and perform several functions including
conciliation/mediation and arbitration. See State of Minnesota, Bureau of
Mediation Services (visited Feb. 19, 1999) <http://www.bms.state.mn.us/>.
The Division of Conciliation was later renamed the BMS and was delegated
additional responsibility to deal with the complexity of modern contract nego-
tiations and the "growing acceptance of mediation." Id. "In 1993, the Legisla-
ture transferred the Minnesota Office of Dispute Resolution to the BMS." Id.;
see also State of Minnesota, Office of Dispute Resolution (visited Feb. 19,
1999) <http'//www.bms.state.nm.us/officeof_disputejreso-lution.htm> (ex-
plaining that the Minnesota Office of Dispute Resolution (MODR) provides
dispute resolution to public agencies); Roger S. Williams, Bureau of Mediation
Services, Office of Dispute Resolution, in MINNESOTA ADR DESKBOOK § 15.2
(Gary A. Weissman ed., 1998) (detailing the history and functions of the BMS
and Office of Dispute Resolution).
83. See MINN. STAT. § 179.01; see also Williams, supra note 82, §15.2A.
84. MINN. STAT. §§ 179.01-.17.
85. Id. §§ 583.20-.32.
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der these statutes are minimal to nonexistent. 86 A quick ex-
amination of the disciplinary authority of the BMS, and of that
provided for in both the MLRA and FLMA, demonstrates the
lack of control over ADR neutrals practicing pursuant to these
statutes.87
Favoring the movement towards peacefully solving labor
disputes, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the MLRA.88 The
MLRA contains a relatively complex set of qualification re-
quirements, ethical responsibility provisions, and removal pro-
cedures for the neutrals that practice labor ADR.89 Under the
MLRA, the Public Employment Relations Board maintains a
roster of arbitrators and mediators impaneled by the BMS.90 A
neutral must meet the qualification requirements91 set forth by
the BMS to maintain her position on the roster.92 Further-
86. See discussion supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text; see also in-
fra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
87. It is important to note that ADR is practiced pursuant to several
Minnesota statutes, each containing its own rules or no rules at all governing
ADR neutrals that practice under them. Compare MINN. STAT § 583.26 subd.
6 (prescribing the eligibility standards and duties of a mediator practicing un-
der the mortgage moratorium statute), and id. § 583.26 subd. 7 (granting the
mediator liability and immunity "within the scope of the position as media-
tor"), with id. § 494.015 (setting forth training and other requirements of neu-
trals practicing publicly-supported community dispute resolution programs).
88. The preamble to the MLRA states:
It is the policy of the state of Minnesota to promote orderly and con-
structive relationships between labor and management and to avoid
unresolved disputes that can be injurious to the public as well as the
parties. The use of collective bargaining procedures and binding ar-
bitration to resolve grievances and certain interest disputes between
labor and management are specifically encouraged.
MINN. R. 7320.0020 (1997). Currently, arbitration and mediation are the
leading methods of solving labor disputes. See COOLEY & LUBET, supra note
9, at 21; PONTE & CAVENAGH, supra note 7, at 288 (stating that "[airbitration
has become an essential tool for the peaceful resolution of labor and employ-
ment disputes"); MURRAY ET AL., supra note 18, at 75 (noting that "labor dis-
putes were the first significant area in which mediation was routinely used" in
the United States).
89. See MINN. R. 5530.1300.
90. The roster is "a listing of persons determined by the commissioner to
be qualified and available for referral as an arbitrator of labor disputes." Id.
at 5530.0300(3).
91. To be a qualified arbitrator, one must "have a substantial knowledge
of collective bargaining and labor relations in the public and private sectors,
be well versed in applicable state and federal law, and be experienced and
knowledgeable in the field of labor arbitration." Id. at 5530.0600(1). Addi-
tionally, the arbitrator must "conduct hearings in a fair and impartial man-
ner." Id. at 5530.0600(2).
92. See id. at 5530.0600.
18571999]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
more, the BMS maintains a professional and ethical responsi-
bility provision, which all persons on the roster must honor.93
The statute also provides procedures and grounds for which
the neutral may be removed from the arbitration case, and/or
removed or suspended from the roster, provided that they are
given notice.94 Grounds for suspension or removal include a
violation of the rules or the applicable code of ethics, and non-
acceptance by the parties.95
Comparatively, the FLMA provides little protection to the
parties from neutral misconduct before, during, and after me-
diation. Under the FLMA, creditors and farmers are required
to mediate in good faith (or face sanctions) prior to foreclosures
or other adverse credit proceedings.96 The FLMA provides vol-
untary and mandatory mediation services for farmers and
creditors. 97 The director of the Agricultural Extension Service
is responsible for appointing mediators to mediate the dispute,
unless otherwise requested by the court.98 Additionally, the di-
rector of the Agricultural Extension Service, through a farm
mediation administrator and the Local County Extension
Agents, administers the mediation programs.99 Under the
FLMA, the director must provide mediators with skills train-
ing, including "mediation process, skills, and farm finance is-
sues in mediation."00 While the FLMA declares a mediator in-
eligible "if the person has a conflict of interest that does not
allow the person to be impartial,"'10 a conflict of interest is only
93. See id. at 5530.0800. The neutrals practicing for the BMS are also
governed by the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-
Management Disputes, which is approved and published by the National
Academy of Arbitrators. See id. at 5530.0800(2). The BMS requires each ar-
bitrator to disclose "any personal or professional relationships, including di-
rect or indirect past employment, consultative relationships, or affiliation
with one of the parties, which may give an appearance of partiality. The bur-
den of disclosure is on the arbitrator." Id. at 5530.0800(3); see also id. at
5530.0600(3) (stating that "no applicant or roster member may currently, or
within the preceding 12 months, have functioned as an advocate for any public
or private sector employer, employee, or employee organization in any phase
of labor management relations").
94. See id. at 5530.1300.
95. See id.
96. See MINN. STAT. § 583.27 (1998).
97. See id. § 583.25-.26.
98. See MINN. R. 1502.0025.
99. See BAXTER DUNWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE:
FORECLOSURE, WORKOUTS, PROCEDURES § 4A.03(6)(a) (1997).
100. MINN. R. 1502.0004(A).
101. MINN. STAT § 583.26 subd. 6.
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defined as "being a current or past board member or officer of
the initiating creditor."10 2 Additionally, unlike MLRA, the
FLMA lacks a code of ethics and the authority to remove or
discipline any mediator serving under the FLMA; moreover,
the FLMA provides the mediator with qualified civil immu-
ity.103
C. PRiVATE ORGANIZATIONS' STANDARDS OF ADR NEUTRAL
CONDUCT
The success and support of ADR has generated an incredi-
ble growth in the private ADR industry.10 4 Presently, hun-
dreds of private dispute resolution organizations, both for-
profit and nonprofit, are providing relatively inexpensive and
efficient means of resolving simple and complex legal dis-
putes. 0 5 These organizations have had a dramatic impact on
102. See id. Although FLMA does not provide disciplinary measures for
mediator misconduct, it does state that a mediator may not be approved by
the director to mediate a dispute in a mandatory mediation proceeding unless
the professional mediator prepares and signs an affidavit:
(1) disclosing any biases, relationships, or previous associations
with the debtor or creditors subject to the mediation proceeding;,
(2) stating certifications, training, or qualifications as a pro-
fessional mediator;
(3) disclosing fees to be charged or a rate schedule of fees for the
mediation proceeding;, and
(4) affirming to uphold the Farmer-Lender Mediation Act and
faithfully discharge the duties of a mediator.
Id. § 583.26 subd. 4(e)(1)-(4).
103. See id. § 583.26 subd. 7.
104. See Mike Jay Garcia, Key Trends in the Legal Profession, 71 FLA. B.J.
16, 16 (1997). For a comprehensive directory of ADR organizations in Minne-
sota, see Symposium, Directory of Alternative Dispute Resolution Organiza-
tions, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 281 (1997). ADR is now available to
websurfers in cyberspace as well as through Virtual Magistrate, a pilot pro-
gram initiated by the AAA and other organizations, which started to accept
cases in March 1996. See Virtual Magistrate (visited Mar. 12, 1999)
<http//vmag.vcilp.org>; see also Phyllis M. Hix et al., Mediation, or Is It?
Everything You Thought You Knew, but Maybe You Didn't, 65 DEF. COUNS. J.
256, 260-61 (1998) (discussing the development of ADR in cyberspace).
105. See MURRAY ETAL., supra note 30, at 28-30 (citing for example that in
1994, more than 59,000 cases were filed with the AAA, which has more than
25,000 neutrals on its roster); see also Karelis, supra note 10, at 627-28 (not-
ing the incredible statistical and economic growth of ADR organizations in the
early nineties). The Minnesota Supreme Court has posted on the World Wide
Web a complete list of the hundreds of "qualified" neutrals and organizations
practicing in Minnesota. See generally Supreme Court Continuing Education,
Minnesota Statewide ADR: Rule 114 Neutrals Roster (visited Mar. 13, 1999)
<http://www.courts.state.mn us adr/adrciv/html>
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our civil justice system by reducing court dockets nationwide. 10 6
The private ADR system has become a vital resource and an
indispensable forum to the public justice system. 07
In an effort to increase the quality control of ADR neutrals,
some of the major professional ADR organizations, such as the
AAA and SPIDR, have privately established their own ethical
standards and enforcement procedures, which are internally
policed and distributed to clients.108 In fact, some of these pri-
vate organizations pioneered the establishment of ADR neutral
professional responsibility standards.1 09 Nonetheless, it re-
mains unclear whether these privately-promulgated ethical
standards and codes will have any force in litigation involving
the quality control of a private ADR neutral given that the
courts do not sanction most of these standards." 0 Further-
more, these private ADR organizations lack disciplinary
authority over ADR neutrals and must "rely upon individual
professions to undertake enforcement sanctions against one of
their members.""' For the most part, private parties resorting
to private ADR to resolve their disputes rely primarily on tra-
ditional contract law to remedy neutral misconduct that has
proven to be mostly inadequate.112
The efforts of the private organizations, however, should
be acclaimed for what they represent rather than what they
cannot ultimately achieve-a uniform set of standards of con-
duct for ADR neutrals. For example, recognizing the rapid
106. See Karelis, supra note 10, at 621 (noting that "[allthough private civil
dispute resolution organizations are by no means a recent development, the
rapid rise of large, for profit, private dispute centers has had a profound effect
on the resolution of disputes nationwide"); Elizabeth Roth, Private ADR: Es-
caping the Courthouse, 2 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 6, 6 (1995) (discussing the effect
private ADR organizations have had on court dockets in Los Angeles County);
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 225 (stating that "as courts have strug-
gled to deal with sharply increasing case loads, a number of jurisdictions have
adopted a dispute resolution process that merges public and private forms of
adjudication").
107. See Karelis, supra note 10, at 624.
108. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 1921; see also Hix et al., supra
note 104, at 260. The ABA is an excellent source of potential mediators.
There is a plethora of mediation resources within the ABA organized by sec-
tions, divisions, or forums such as Business Law, Construction Industry, Gen-
eral Practice, Intellectual Property Law, Labor and Employment Law, Litiga-
tion, Torts and Insurance Practice.
109. See Moore, supra note 15, at 680-81.
110. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 431.
111. Symposium, supra note 12, at 96.
112. See Feerick, supra note 13, at 315.
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growth of mediation and the subsequent lack of adequate
regulatory control and guidance, the AAA, ABA and SPIDR es-
tablished a joint committee in 1992 to advance a workable code
of conduct for all mediators. Earlier, the AAA and ABA had
developed an intricate ethical model for neutral arbitrators
that resulted in the proposed Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators." 3 The purposes of the Standards include "the pro-
motion of integrity and impartiality in mediation, the handling
of conflicts and the appearance of conflict of interest, and the
treatment of fees in mediation, among others."" 4 Most impor-
tantly for the purposes of this Note, "the goal of the Standards
is to encourage mediation of a high quality without drawing a
distinction between the lawyer-mediator and other professional
mediators. "I's Furthermore, "the Standards are intended to be
a starting point in the development of national ethical guide-
lines for the practice of mediation."116 Nevertheless, the Stan-
dards were not established to prescribe "legal standards" for
mediators; that is, the Standards "do not deal with whether a
violation of a particular standard should subject a mediator to
liability.""/7 Thus, although privately-established standards of
conduct for ADR neutrals are commendable, they provide the
public with only negligible protection from ADR neutral mis-
conduct.
D. STATE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND
OCCUPATIONAL CODES OF ETHICS
While specific statutory measures prescribe vague and ar-
guably insufficient ethical guidelines and disciplinary meas-
ures governing ADR neutrals,"8 another source of ADR regula-
113. See Feerick, supra note 34, at 458.
114. Id. at 459. In developing the Standards, the joint committee drew on
a number of existing codes of ethics for neutrals, particularly codes developed
in states such as Florida, Hawaii, Texas, Colorado, and Oregon. Additionally,
ethical codes for mediators and arbitrators developed by various organizations
were reviewed in drafting the Standards, namely from the following:
AAA/ABA; AAA and National Academy of Arbitrators and Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service; American Bar Association for Professional Respon-
sibility; American Bar Association; SPIDR; Academy for Family Mediators;
Association of Family and Conciliation Courts; and Center for Dispute Set-
tlement at the Institute of Judicial Administration. See id. at 314-16.
115. Id. at 459.
116. Id. at 476.
117. Id. at 467. Generally, proving mediator liability is particularly diffi-
cult. See cases cited infra note 154.
118. See generally discussion supra Parts I.A-C.
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tion is the array of professional codes of conduct and discipli-
nary standards promulgated by the numerous state boards
charged with the responsibility of regulating numerous occupa-
tions.119 Because one of the most important characteristics of
ADR is the parties' freedom to select, or not select, a neutral
who is professionally familiar with the substantive background
of the dispute to render and facilitate a decision during the
ADR process, ADR neutrals necessarily come from varying pro-
fessional backgrounds. 120 This transdisciplinary element of
neutral regulation presents an equally perplexing problem in
that ADR neutrals (both nonlawyers and lawyers) are governed
by varying ethical standards (or no ethical standards at all in
cases in which the neutral is not a licensed or certified profes-
sional). The following section investigates the inadequacy of
professional ethical codes as applied to neutrals that are both
lawyers and nonlawyers.121
1. Professional Responsibility of Nonlawyer ADR Neutrals
Pursuant to its police powers under the Minnesota Consti-
tution,22 the legislature has established examining and licens-
119. See Symposium, supra note 12, at 95 (stating that ADR neutrals re-
main subject to their professional codes while practicing as ADR neutrals); see
also MINN STAT. § 326.01 (1998) (regarding employment licensed by the state);
id. § 148.01 (licensing public health occupations); id. § 148.90 (establishing the
board of psychology); id. § 148B.19 (establishing the board of social work); id.
§ 326.04 (establishing the board of architecture, engineering, land surveying,
landscape architecture, geoscience and interior design [hereinafter board of
architecture]); id. § 326.165 (establishing the board of accountancy).
120. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 10, at 683-84 (noting that the "best
neutrals are those who understand the field in which they work" and recog-
nize "the need for substantive expertise" if "nonlegal values are to resolve dis-
putes"); Symposium, supra note 12, at 95 (noting that many neutrals are
members of other professions-such as lawyers, psychologists, therapists, and
social workers).
121. An investigation of all forms of disciplinary action and codes of con-
duct applicable to all licensed professionals in Minnesota who may serve as
ADR neutrals is beyond the scope of this Note. However, for the purposes of
this Note, an examination of the regulations governing licensed accountants,
architects, and psychologists (a satisfactory sample of nonlawyer professionals
likely to serve as ADR neutrals) substantially demonstrates that existing
codes of conduct governing licensed occupations insufficiently regulate ADR
neutrals.
122. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 1 (declaring that "[glovernment is insti-
tuted for the security, benefit and protection of the people, in whom all politi-
cal power is inherent, together with the right to alter, modify or reform gov-
ernment whenever required by the public good").
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ing boards 123 to regulate specific health-related 124 and non-
health-related professions. 25 Even though "occupational licen-
sure has an ancient lineage,"126 the propagation and pressured
expansion of licensed occupations caused the 1976 Minnesota
Legislature to impose "limitations to stem the impetus toward
greater licensing"127 by promulgating the Occupational Li-
censing Act (OLA).128 The OLA was enacted because the legis-
lature found "that the interests of the people of the state are
served by the regulation of certain occupations;" 129 therefore, it
will only regulate an occupation if it is "required for the safety
and well-being of the citizens of the state."130
123. These various occupational boards are considered administrative
agencies vested in the executive branch, which generally have "(i) the power
to perform administrative acts, which may include the expenditure of state
money, (ii) the power to issue and revoke licenses or certifications, (iii) the
power to make rules, or (iv) the power to adjudicate contested cases or ap-
peals." MINN. STAT. § 15.012 (a)(i)-(iv).
124. See generally The Occupational Licensing Act, MINN. STAT. § 214.01
subd. 2 (listing the various health-related licensing boards, such as the board
of medical practice, the board of psychology, the board of social work, and the
board of dentistry).
125. See generally id. § 214.01 subd. 3 (listing the various non-health-
related licensing boards, including the board of barber examiners, the board of
architecture, and the board of accountancy).
126. Note, Recent Minnesota Cases and Legislative Developments, 3 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 270, 271 (1977).
127. Id-
128. See supra note 124.
129. MINN. STAT. § 214.001 subd. 1. The legislature found further:
(1) that it is desirable for boards composed primarily of members of
the occupations so regulated to be charged with formulating the poli-
cies and standards governing the occupation; (2) that economical and
efficient administration of the regulation activities can be achieved
through the provision of administrative services by departments of
state government; and (3) that procedural fairness in the disciplining
of persons regulated by the boards requires a separation of the inves-
tigative and prosecutorial functions from the board's judicial respon-
sibility.
Id. § 214.001 subds. 1-3.
130. In determining "whether an occupation shall be regulated," the legis-
lature will consider four factors:
(a) Whether the unregulated practice of an occupation may
harm or endanger the health, safety and welfare of citizens of the
state and whether the potential for harm is recognizable and not re-
mote;
(b) Whether the practice of an occupation requires specialized
skill or training and whether the public needs and will benefit by as-
surances of initial and continuing occupational ability,
(c) Whether the citizens of this state are or may be effectively
protected by other means;
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On the whole, ADR neutrals practice in an unlicensed
"free-market."131 Because there is no single occupational board
that regulates all ADR neutrals, some critics have suggested
that nonlawyer ADR neutrals continue to be regulated by their
own professional standards of conduct when practicing as an
ADR neutral and not as a licensee. 32 While this contention
seems legally rational, the application of these varying profes-
sional codes of conduct proves to be irrational and inadvisable
for several reasons.
First and foremost, the existing health and non-health li-
censing boards 133 are delegated the explicit responsibilities of
establishing rules regulating each specific occupation that the
boards are empowered to enforce. 134 Pursuant to these powers
the boards have established codes of professional and ethical
conduct; however, the codes only pertain to a licensee when she
acts within the scope of her practice, not when she acts as an
ADR neutral charged with the unique duties of administering
justice and resolving disputes.135 Furthermore, the individual
(d) Whether the overall cost effectiveness and economic impact
would be positive for citizens of the state.
Id. § 214.001 subd. 2(a)-Cd).
131. Devine, supra note 38, at 193 n.37 (citing AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION TODAY-THE STATE OF THE ART 135
(1988)). The ADR Review Board had previously adopted the "free market"
policy, endorsed by SPIDR, "giving attorneys and parties wide discretion on
the choice of the process as well as the neutral" in their committee report on
Standards and Qualifications. ADR Review Board Report, supra note 26, at 3.
132. See Symposium, supra note 12, at 95.
133. See MINN. STAT. § 214.001 subd. 1 (establishing the various examin-
ing and licensing boards and stating that "the interests of the people of the
state are served by the regulation of certain occupations"); id. § 214.01 subds.
2-3 (defining health-related licensing board and non-health-related licensing
board); id. § 326.04 (establishing the board of architecture); id. § 326.165 (es-
tablishing the board of accountancy); id. § 148.90 (establishing the board of
psychology).
134. For example, Minnesota Statutes section 148.905 states that "[t]he
board [of psychology] shall: (1) adopt and enforce rules for licensing psycholo-
gists and psychological practitioners and for regulating their professional con-
duct; (2) adopt and enforce rules of conduct governing the practice of psychol-
ogy." See also id. § 326.18 subd. 3 (empowering the board of accountancy to
"make rules to govern administration of the board, examinations, issuance of
certificates, licensing, professional conduct and discipline, continuing educa-
tion, fees, and practice monitoring); id. § 326.06 (empowering the board of ar-
chitecture to promulgate rules of professional conduct).
135. A comprehensive analysis of each occupational board's powers to dis-
cipline its licensees is beyond the scope of this Note; however, a cursory ex-
amination of these powers bears mentioning. Generally, occupational boards
are authorized to take disciplinary action against applicants, licensees, and
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certificate holders under the governing statutes or rules of conduct promul-
gated by the boards themselves. See, e.g., id. § 148.941 subd. 2(a) (regarding
the board of psychology's authority to discipline licensees); id. § 326.111 subd.
4(a) (pertaining to the board of architecture's authority to take action against
applicants and licensees); id. § 326.229 subd. 4(a) (regarding the board of ac-
countancy's power to deny, revoke, or suspend the license or application of
persons practicing public accounting); see also id. § 148.98 (authorizing the
board of psychology to "adopt rules of conduct to govern an applicant's or li-
censee's practices or behavior"). The statutory grounds upon which each
board may take action against licensees and applicants vary greatly and are,
in most instances, germane to the respective occupation and irrelevant as ap-
plied to others. Compare id. § 326.111 subd. 4(a)(1)-(10) (describing the statu-
tory grounds upon which the board of architecture may discipline a licensee),
with id. § 148.941 subd. 2(a)(1)-(10) (describing the grounds upon which the
board of psychology may discipline a licensee). Even the most open-ended
statutory purposes for discipline are restricted to the specific regulated pro-
fession. For example, the board of psychology may discipline a licensee or ap-
plicant if she "has engaged in fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest conduct,
whether or not the conduct relates to the practice of psychology, that ad-
versely affects the person's ability or fitness to practice psychology." Id. §
148.941 subd. 2(a)(2) (emphasis added). The "practice of psychology" does not
include practicing as an ADR neutral. See id. § 148.89 subd. 5 (defining the
practice of psychology as "the observation, description, evaluation, interpreta-
tion, and modification of human behavior by the application of psychological
principles, methods, and procedures, to prevent or eliminate symptomatic,
maladaptive, or undesired behavior and to enhance interpersonal relation-
ships, work and life adjustment, personal and organizational effectiveness,
behavioral health, and mental health" and listing other services that fall
within the practice of psychology).
Pursuant to their statutory authority, the boards have also established
rules of conduct which additionally prescribe standards governing licensees
beyond the rules enumerated in the statutes. See, e.g., MINN. R. 1100.4000-
.6200 (1997) (setting forth the code of professional conduct for public account-
ants); id. at 1805.0100-.0900 (regarding the rules of professional conduct as
established by the board of architecture); id. at 7200.4500-.5700 (defining the
rules of professional conduct for licensed psychologists). At first blush, some
of the rules of professional conduct promulgated by the boards could be serv-
iceably applied in a disciplinary action against a licensee who may have acted
unethically as an ADR neutral. For example, psychologists must protect the
privacy of their clients much like an ADR neutral must respect the confidenti-
ality of the parties during the ADR process. Compare, e.g., id. at 7200.4700(1)
(requiring that "private information is disclosed to others only with the in-
formed written consent of the client"); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., Code of
Ethics, Rule IV; id. at 114.08 (prescribing the confidentiality requirements for
an ADR neutral on the court roster); and MINN. R. 1100.4500(A)-(E) (requir-
ing public accountants to maintain objectivity and remain free of conflicts of
interest), with MLNN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., Code of Ethics, Rules I-I1 (re-
quiring ADR neutrals on the court roster to remain impartial while also dis-
closing "all actual and potential conflicts of interest reasonably known to the
neutral"). Nevertheless, while one may strongly argue that these rules and
codes of conduct sufficiently and clearly apply to licensees practicing as an
ADR neutral, the rules of conduct and professional codes apply only within
the scope of the specific practice, which does not include practicing as an ADR
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board members are generally not in the position and do not
have the desired qualifications to hear a complaint against and
subsequently discipline a licensee who acted unethically as an
ADR neutral. 136 There is also no procedural or substantive
neutral. See, e.g., MINN. R. 1805.0100 (stating that the rule of professional
conduct governing architects "is adopted for the purpose of implementing the
laws and rules governing the practice of architecture, engineering, land sur-
veying, landscape architecture, and geoscience") (emphasis added); id. at
7200.4500(1) (declaring that the rules of conduct regulating psychologists "ap-
ply to the conduct of all licensees and applicants, including conduct during the
period of education, training, and employment which is required for licen-
sure") (emphasis added); id. at 1100.4200(1) (specifying that the code of pro-
fessional conduct governing public accountants "appl[ies] to all services per-
formed in the practice of public accounting including tax and management
advisory services"). Others may also argue that other, less exacting rules may
envelop licensee misconduct as an ADR neutral. See, e.g., id. at 7200.5700
(describing unprofessional conduct as any conduct violating the enumerated
rules of conduct and "those standards of professional behavior that have be-
come established by consensus of the expert opinion of psychologists as rea-
sonably necessary for the protection of the public interest"); id. at
1100.43000(1) (stating that a licensed public accountant "shall not commit an
act discreditable to the profession"). These attenuated arguments, however,
probably will not be effective.
136. Occupational board members are hardly experts in determining
whether an ADR neutral should be disciplined for unethical conduct. For ex-
ample, the board of psychology consists of eleven members: three licensed
psychologists with doctoral degrees in psychology; two licensed psychologists
with master's degrees in psychology;, two not necessarily licensed psycholo-
gists, one of whom has a doctoral degree in psychology and who represents a
doctoral training program in psychology, and another who holds a master's
degree in a training program in psychology;, one person licensed or qualified to
be a psychological practitioner; and three members of the general public. See
MINN. STAT. § 148.90 subd. 1(a); see also id. § 326.04 (defining the qualifica-
tions of the twenty-one members of the board of architecture, all but five with
specific training within the licensed occupation); id. § 326.17 (defining the
seven- to nine-member board of accountancy in which two of the members will
not have licenses in accounting). Naturally, the legislature has an interest in
structuring the membership of boards such that experts in the field promul-
gate standards and policies to regulate each occupation. See generally id. §
214.001 subd. 1 (noting that it is the policy of the legislature "that it is desir-
able for boards composed primarily of members of the occupations so regu-
lated to be charged with formulating the policies and standards governing the
occupation"). It is commonplace for the board or regulatory agency to be com-
prised of experts within the specific field or occupation because they are in the
best position to collect information and they possess expertise about occupa-
tional matters beyond the three traditional branches of government. See
DANIEL J. GIFFORD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 6-9 (1992).
For a general discussion of the policies justifying the establishment and rule-
making authority of administrative agencies and boards, see ARTHUR EARL
BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING 3-11 (1986). Therefore, af-
ter looking at who serves on the occupational boards, one could strongly argue
that each board, while consisting of experts in their respective fields, hardly
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reason to believe that the respective boards would investigate
or act upon such a complaint 137 In fact, an examination of
Minnesota caselaw and selected board decisions failed to locate
one instance in which an occupational board received or filed a
complaint against a licensee for acting unethically as an ADR
neutral. 138 Finally, even if the boards could take disciplinary
action against the licensee, they could only revoke, suspend, or
deny her occupational license but could not prevent her from
further practicing as an ADR neutral.139 Therefore, unless it
can be successfully argued that a licensee who acts unethically
as an ADR neutral discredits her respective occupational prac-
tice (an argument not supported by the rules regulating the
professionals), the occupational licensing boards probably do
not have the statutory authority to discipline licensees for ADR
professional misconduct. The need for universal and uniform
standards of ADR professional conduct will only be greatly
amplified in the event that the occupational boards begin to in-
vestigate and discipline professional ADR misconduct.
2. Professional Responsibility of Lawyers Acting As ADR
Neutrals
Professional responsibility issues have traditionally posed
some of the most troublesome dilemmas lawyers encounter in
practice. 140 For the most part, ethical problems and conflicts
arise because of the "tensions or conflicts between three ideas
that are central to the lawyer's role: the lawyer as fiduciary,
the lawyer as an officer of the court functioning in an adver-
has the desired expertise to determine the proper ethical standards for ADR
neutrals.
137. For example, The Occupational Licensing Act limits the boards to in-
vestigating complaints that allege a violation of a statute or rule that the
board is empowered to enforce. See id. § 214.10 subds. 1-2 (defining the pre-
cise procedure each board must follow upon receiving a complaint and the
grounds upon which each is authorized to act); id. § 214.103 subd. 2 (defining
the procedure for receiving complaints and conducting investigations for
health-related licensing boards).
138. See Telephone Interview with Kent Wagner, supra note 38.
139. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 148.941 subds. 2(b), 3 (identifying the actions
the board of psychology may take against a licensee who violates a statute or
rule that the board is empowered to enforce); see also id. § 326.111 subd. 4(a)
(listing actions the board of accountancy may take against a licensee in viola-
tion of a statute or rule that the board of architecture is empowered to en-
force); id. § 326.229 subds. 4(a), 4a (listing the actions the board of account-
ancy may take).
140. See CRYSTAL, supra note 2, at 1-9.
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sarial system, and the lawyer as an individual with personal
values and interests."1 41 To combat these tensions and to de-
vise appropriate behavior for the professional discipline of law-
yers, an expansive body of law and rules of professional disci-
pline composed of numerous statutes, judicial decisions, and
court rules has developed and evolved over the years "to pro-
tect the public, to guard the administration of justice, and to
deter future misconduct." 42 Notwithstanding the impressive
amplitude and scope of these standards and disciplinary
measures, it has become increasingly apparent that these
standards inadequately apply to and insufficiently guide law-
yers practicing as ADR neutrals.
141. Id. at 1; see also MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl.,
para. 8 (1998) (stating that "[virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from
conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and
to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a
satisfactory living"). See generally RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFEREY M. SMITH,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE (3d. 1989) (providing a comprehensive guide to all pub-
lished judicial authority and an analysis of settled principles of legal malprac-
tice litigation); RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, TRIAL
ETHICS (1988) (focusing on the ethical problems associated with the specific
stages of litigation).
142. In re Disciplinary Action Against Weems, 540 N.W.2d 305, 308 (1995)
(per curiam); see also, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 481.15 (defining the statutory
causes for the removal and suspension of attorneys); MINN. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT scope, para. 1. The formal examination of aspiring
lawyers assures the public that lawyers are adequately trained regardless of
their academic backgrounds. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & DEBORAH L.
RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 466 (2d.
ed. 1988). Once a bar applicant is "licensed" to practice law in Minnesota,
thus becoming an attorney, her conduct is governed by the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct, which are strictly enforced by the Lawyers Board of
Professional Responsibility and the Minnesota Supreme Court. See In re
Smith, 19 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Minn. 1945) (stating that "[t]he right to practice
law is a matter of license and high privilege and is in no sense an absolute
right. It is in the nature of a franchise, to the enjoyment of which one is ad-
mitted only upon proof of fitness and qualification, which must be maintained
if the privilege is to continue in enjoyment"). Under the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct, a lawyer is deemed "a representative of clients, an offi-
cer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for
the quality of justice." MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl., para.
1. In determining what disciplinary action the court shall take, the court
"'weigh[s] the nature of the misconduct, the cumulative weight of the discipli-
nary rule violations, and the potential harm to the public, to the legal profes-
sion, and to the administration of justice. ' In re Disciplinary Action Against
Jensen, 542 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting In re Shoe-
maker, 518 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1994)). For a general description of the
procedure of lawyer accountability, see Maute, supra note 37, at 508.
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For the most part, the judicial branch possesses the
authority to regulate lawyers. The separation of powers doc-
trine43 embodied in the Minnesota Constitution ' " essentially
prohibits the legislative and executive branches from regulat-
ing lawyers like other occupations such as accountants and
psychologists.1 45 Unlike other state constitutions, however, the
Minnesota Constitution does not expressly confer the authority
to regulate lawyers and the practice of law to the judicial
branch.146
143. The separation of powers doctrine, while famously developed at the
federal level, also defines the axiomatic parameters that circumscribe the
three branches' powers in state government. Compare U.S. CONST. arts. I-Ill
with MINN. CONST. art. IH; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957 (1983)
(insisting that "[tihe hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable
objectives, must be resisted"). More than two-hundred years ago, James
Madison explained the purpose of the separation of powers doctrine by stating
that "[tihe accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyr-
anny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Willmoore Kendall
& George W. Carey eds., 1966).
144. The Minnesota Constitution is one of thirty-four state constitutions
that expressly provides that the powers shall be separate and distinct, stat-
ing- 'he powers of government shall be divided into three distinct depart-
ments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to
or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers
properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly
provided in this constitution." MINN. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also Michael B.
Browde & M.E. Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-
Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Constraints, 15 N.M.
L. REV. 407, 474-77 (1985) (listing various states' constitutional provisions re-
garding the separation of powers doctrine).
145. See infra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (discussing the judici-
ary's inherent power to regulate the practice of law). Compare MINN. STAT. §
214.001 (1998) (vesting in the executive branch the authority to regulate
health and non-health-related occupations), with id. § 481.01 (establishing the
Board of Law Examiners and vesting the authority to regulate admission to
the practice of law with the Minnesota Supreme Court).
146. A 1956 amendment to the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Consti-
tution placed the authority of promulgating and enforcing court procedural
rules exclusively with the judicial branch. Prior to this amendment, the pro-
cedural rulemaking power was vested completely in the legislative branch,
and the court exerted its inherent power only when the legislature had not
acted in that area. See State v. Johnson, 514 N.W.2d 551, 554 n.4 (Minn.
1994). For a complete history of the separation of powers issues involving
court procedure in Minnesota, see Maynard E. Pirsig & Randall M. Thietjen,
Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota, 15 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 141 (1989).
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Nevertheless, the Minnesota Constitution states that the
judicial power of the state is vested in the Supreme Court,147
and like the federal courts, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
carefully interpreted the state constitution to hold that the ju-
dicial branch has the inherent power to govern its existence
and functions as a court. 148 Accordingly, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court has held that it possesses the exclusive authority
to regulate the practice of law and that any attempt by the
legislature to limit or modify that power is constitutionally im-
permissible. 149 Thus, the statutes regarding the regulation of
147. "The judicial power of the state is hereby vested in a supreme court, a
district court, and such other courts, judicial officers and commissioners with
jurisdiction inferior to the district court as the legislature may establish."
MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1. The supreme court's authority is defined by the
legislature:
The Supreme court shall have all the authority necessary for carrying
into execution its judgments and determinations, and for the exercise
of its jurisdiction as the supreme judicial tribunal of the state, agree-
able to the usages and principles of law. Such court shall prescribe,
and from time to time may amend and modify, rules of practice
therein and also rules governing the examination and admission to
practice of attorneys at law and rules governing their conduct in the
practice of their profession, and rules concerning the presentation,
hearing, and determination of accusations against attorneys at law
not inconsistent with law, and may provide for the publication
thereof at the cost of the state.
MINN. STAT. § 480.05.
148. The Minnesota Supreme Court explained that
[t]he judicial power of this court has its origin in the Constitution,
but when the court came into existence, it came with inherent pow-
ers. Such power is the right to protect itself, to enable it to adminis-
ter justice whether any previous form of remedy has been granted or
not. This same power authorizes the making of rules of practice.
In re Disbarment of Greathouse, 248 N.W. 735, 737 (1933) (per curiam)
(holding that courts have the inherent power to discipline attorneys for un-
ethical practices, and, therefore, that the Minnesota Supreme Court could
disbar an attorney for employing others to solicit business for him, even
though such conduct was not prohibited by statute). Similarly, in dicta, the
Minnesota Supreme Court accounted for the nature and scope of the court's
inherent powers, stating:.
Inherent judicial power governs that which is essential to the exis-
tence, dignity, and fimction of a court because it is a court. Its source
is the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers as expressed
and implied in our constitution. Its scope is the practical necessity of
ensuring the free and full exercise of the court's vital function-the
disposition of individual cases to deliver remedies for wrongs and
'Jjustice freely and without purchase; completely and without denial;
promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws."
In re Clerk of Court's Comp. for Lyon County v. Lyon County Comm'rs, 241
N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. 1976) (quoting MMN. CONST. art. I, § 8).
149. See In re Tracy, 266 N.W. 88 (Minn. 1936) (per curiam) (invalidating a
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attorneys only broadly define attorney misconduct and the
causes that justify the removal or suspension of an attorney,150
statute of limitations governing disbarment procedures on the grounds that
the statute unconstitutionally placed restrictions on the court's inherent
power to regulate the practice of law). However, in In re Tracy, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court stated that not all legislation regulating the practice of
law would necessarily be unconstitutional. Id. at 93. The court stated that it
would comply with the legislation provided that the court could do so "without
ceasing to function as independent judges" and if the legislation was "found to
be reasonable and just in application" and did not violate public policy. Id.
Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that it will allow the
legislature to pass a statute regulating the practice of law so long as the stat-
ute does not address an area already governed by court rule and the statute
leaves the final decision with the court. See Johnson, 514 N.W.2d at 553-54;
see also Sharood v. Hatfield, 210 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. 1973) (explaining
that "[iut is true that this court has acquiesced in legislative acts prescribing
administrative procedures for admission and discipline of attorneys as long as
such acts did not usurp the right of the court to make the final decision");
Cowern v. Nelson, 290 N.W. 795 (Minn. 1940) (accepting a statute allowing
real estate brokers to draft legal documents but refusing an exemption that
would allow them to charge a fee).
In a related and controversial matter, many ADR experts are vehemently
debating whether or not ADR, especially mediation, constitutes the practice of
law. Compare Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?,
NAT. INST. DIsP. RESOL., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 1, 5 (contending that mediation is
the practice of law because mediators often assess the legal claims and posi-
tions of the disputants and usually predict the outcome of the dispute based
upon the law), with Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers Who Mediate Are Not Practic-
ing Law, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 74, 74 (1996) (responding to
Menkel-Meadow, arguing that mediation is not the practice of law because no
attorney-client relationship exists and because mediation practice is not char-
acterized by advocacy on behalf of clients); Bruce E. Meyerson, Mediation and
the Practice of Law, 3 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 11, 11-12 (1996) (discussing the
regulation of ADR without defining it as the practice of law). Notwithstand-
ing the debate, the consequences of concluding that mediation is the equiva-
lent to practicing law would be monumental with respect to the regulation of
attorneys and to the ADR industry. To begin with, persons without a law de-
gree and who are not licensed to practice law would be prohibited from prac-
ticing as a mediator. See MINN. STAT. § 481.02 (1998) (prohibiting the unli-
censed practice of law). Moreover, lawyers would be subject to their duties
and obligations under the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, which
are incompatible with the ADR practice. See infra notes 156-62 and accompa-
nying text (regarding the inapplicability of the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility to ADR practice). Finally, the courts would have exclusive ju-
risdiction to regulate ADR. See, e.g., In re Tracy, 266 N.W. at 88 (stating that
the court has the inherent power to regulate the disbarment and admission of
attorneys).
150. See generally MINN. STAT. § 481.06 (defining the general duties of at-
torneys); id. § 481.071 (defining attorney misconduct); id. § 481.15 (defining
the causes for removal or suspension from the bar).
The Minnesota Supreme Court essentially possesses the authority to
regulate the practice of law. See id. § 481.01 (establishing the board of law
examiners, whose members are appointed by the supreme court and "which
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and on the whole, the statutes do not state whether an attor-
ney may be disciplined for professional misconduct while prac-
ticing as an ADR neutral.
Even though the most common application of the judici-
ary's inherent powers is the regulation and discipline of its of-
ficers,15' it is difficult to locate common law precedent or court
rules apropos to the discipline of attorney-ADR neutrals en-
gaging in professional misconduct. 52 As previously discussed,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has vacated arbitration awards
in cases in cases in which the attorney-neutral engaged in
some form of professional misconduct.153 The Court, however,
has never enforced a provision of any rule of professional con-
duct to suspend, disbar, or penalize an attorney for engaging in
unethical conduct while practicing as an ADR neutral.154
shall be charged with the administration of such rules and regulations and
with the examination of all applicants for admission to practice law"). The
Minnesota Supreme Court also has the authority to:
prescribe, and from time to time may amend and modify, rules of
practice therein and also rules governing the examination and admis-
sion to practice of attorneys at law and rules governing their conduct
in the practice of their profession, and rules concerning the presenta-
tion, hearing, and determination of accusations against attorneys at
law not inconsistent with law, and may provide for the publication
thereof at the cost of the state.
Id. § 480.05; see also In re Disciplinary Action Against Perry, 494 N.W.2d 290,
293 (Minn. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that "[tihe supreme court is vested
with the final responsibility for determining the appropriate sanctions in at-
torney discipline cases").
151. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text; see, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 480.13-.15 (creating and defining the powers of the State Court Administra-
tor who is appointed by the Minnesota Supreme Court); id. § 480.07-.11 (es-
tablishing and defining various judicial employees who are appointed and su-
pervised by the Minnesota Supreme Court); id. § 480.01 (establishing the
Board of Law Examiners, appointed by the Court, to oversee applications and
admission to the practice of law). Lawyers are "officer[s] of the legal system."
MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl., para. 1 (1998).
152. See infra note 154.
153. See supra notes 66, 68.
154. A Westlaw search of Minnesota cases failed to reveal any instance in
which the Minnesota Supreme Court has disciplined an attorney-neutral for
professional misconduct under any code of professional ethics. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals, however, adopted the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes in 1984 and announced that they would apply them pro-
spectively. See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Stariha, 346 N.W.2d 663, 667 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984). However, from the facts of the case, it appears that the court will
apply these ethical rules only to determine if an arbitration award should be
vacated because of neutral misconduct. In Safeco the court did not vacate an
arbitration award for failure to disclose the existence of a conflict of interest.
Id. at 663. Furthermore, the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board
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Despite the arguments to the contrary, the Minnesota
Rules of Professional Responsibility (MRPR)Y55 do not suffi-
ciently regulate attorney-neutrals. 156 Essentially, the MRPR
(LPRB) has not yet released an official opinion concerning the ethical stan-
dards or expectations of lawyers practicing as ADR neutrals. See Lawyers
Board of Professional Responsibility, Opinions 1-19 (visited Feb. 28, 1999)
<httpl//www.courts.state.mn.us/lbpr/opinions.html> (listing and defining the
official opinions of the LBPR).
Recently, however, other courts have addressed "the issue of whether af-
ter the conclusion of an ADR proceeding an attorney-neutral and his or her
law firm or organization may be disqualified from representing a party in the
same or subsequent case." Krohnke & Frankman, supra note 34, at 4-7; see,
e.g., Poly Software Intl, Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah 1995) (disquali-
fying plaintiffs attorney and his attorney's law firm); Cho v. Superior Court,
45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Cal. App. 2d 1995) (disqualifying law firm); McKenzie
Constr. v. St. Croix Storage Corp., 961 F. Supp. 857 (D. V.I. 1997) (disquali-
fying law firm).
155. See generally MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
156. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 426-54 (arguing that because
of the changing roles of mediators, the Model Rules cannot apply). Model
Rule 5.7 pertaining to ancillary services of attorneys has not been adopted by
the Minnesota courts. See Dennis J. Block et al., Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.7: Its Origin and Interpretation, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 806
(1992) (arguing that Rule 5.7 can be applied to attorney ADR neutrals under
ancillary practice theory); see also infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
Others may attempt to solve this ethical dilemma by arguing that attorney
ADR neutrals, at least those acting as arbitrators, should be held accountable
under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The Code of Judicial Conduct
would apply by virtue of the fact that arbitrators are empowered with the
authority to issue binding judgments (like judges). In fact, the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct provides that unless expressly provided by law, judges shall not
act as arbitrators or mediators. See MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 4(f). However, a retired judge may participate as an arbitrator or me-
diator provided that:
(1) the judge does not participate during the period of any judi-
cial assignment,
(2) the judge is disqualified from mediation and arbitration in
matters in which the judge served as judge, and is disqualified as
judge from matters in which the judge participated as mediator or
arbitrator, unless all parties to the proceeding consent after consulta-
tion, and
(3) the participation does not reflect adversely on the judge's im-
partiality.
Id.
While this seems partly logical, this application is entirely outside the in-
tended scope of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which only "establishes stan-
dards for the ethical conduct of judges to reflect the responsibilities of the ju-
dicial office as a public trust and to promote confidence in our legal system."
Id. at pmbl. The Code of Judicial Conduct defines a "judge" as "anyone,
whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system and who per-
forms judicial functions, including an officer such as a referee, special master,
or magistrate." Id. at cmts.-application.
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only contemplate and accommodate the role of an attorney
acting within the traditional client-lawyer relationship, 157 prac-
ticing as a zealous advocate 158 or a counselor159 A close exami-
nation of two Minnesota Rules of Professional Responsibility
arguably applicable to an attorney practicing as an ADR neu-
tral-rule 2.2 (pertaining to attorneys practicing as "interme-
diaries") 160 and rule 8.4 (regarding attorney "professional mis-
conduct" in general)161-confirms that they do not adequately
provide ethical standards for the attorney acting as an ADR
neutral because the neutral possesses qualities and responsi-
bilities necessarily in direct conflict with those of an attor-
ney.162 Furthermore, despite the Court's history of unsympa-
157. See generally MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1-1.17
(prescribing professional standards such as competence, diligence, communi-
cation and confidentiality).
158. See generally id. Rules 3.1-3.9 (prescribing professional standards of
advocacy such as expediting litigation, candor toward the tribunal and advo-
cacy in non-tribunal proceedings).
159. See generally id. Rules 2.1-2.3 (prescribing the professional standards
of a lawyer acting as an advisor or intermediary).
160. See id. Rule 2.2. At first blush Rule 2.2 (regarding attorneys acting as
intermediaries) appears to also apply to attorneys practicing as ADR neutrals.
The nile, however, expressly "does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbitrator
or mediator between or among parties who are not clients of the lawyer, even
where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the parties." Id.
Rule 2.2 cmt., para. 2. The comment does state that if a lawyer performs in
these capacities, the lawyer "may be subject to applicable codes of ethics, such
as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes."
161. See id. Rule 8.4. Rule 8.4 states that "a lawyer should be profession-
ally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics
relevant to the practice of law." Id. Rule 8.4 cmt., para. 1. The rule provides a
definition for characteristics relevant to the practice of law, stating among
other things that "[uit is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; [or] ... con-
duct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." To a large extent,
this general proscription overlaps with other rules that prohibit dishonesty or
misrepresentation. See, e.g., id. Rule 1.4 (stating that a lawyer is obliged to
keep clients reasonably informed about the status of a matter); Rule 3.3
(stating that a lawyer must not make false statements of law or fact to a tri-
bunal); Rule 3.4 (demanding that a lawyer must not obstruct, falsify or con-
ceal evidence); Rule 4.1 (stating that a lawyer must not make false statements
of law or fact to a third party). Arguably, however, ADR neutral misconduct
may fall into one of the categories of "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepre-
sentation." Id. Rule 8.4(c). For example, it can be argued that a neutral's
failure to disclose a conflict of interest to a party to the ADR process is profes-
sional misconduct under Rule 8.4 because it is dishonest, or at the very least
"conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." Nonetheless,
such a proposition is not yet supported by adequate caselaw. See supra notes
77, 154 and accompanying text.
162. See generally Moore, supra note 15, at 720 (concluding that while
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thetically' 63 disciplining attorneys for professional misconduct
arising outside the practice of law,164 it is not necessarily a
foregone conclusion that the courts will discipline attorney-
neutrals under the rules of professional responsibility which
are primarily promulgated to deal with issues arising under
the traditional attorney-client relationship.165 Thus, notwith-
standing the remarkable lineage and breadth of the numerous
rules and court decisions governing attorney conduct both
within and outside the scope of the practice of law, it is likely
that the courts will continue to do no more than vacate arbitra-
tion and mediation awards when the attorney-neutral engages
in misconduct, or at the most disqualify the neutral if the mis-
conduct occurs before the award is ordered.1 66 Notably, these
disciplinary measures (if they may be called that) have no ef-
fect on the attorney-neutral's ability to continue practicing as a
neutral. 67
some Model Rules peripherally comprehend the regulation of attorneys acting
as mediators, the Model Rules are inadequate to guide and govern attorneys
acting as mediators); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 445-48. This notion
has obviously been embraced by many jurisdictions, including Minnesota, the
evidence being Rule 114 itself.
163. "[Blecause the court's primary duty is protection of the public . . .
'[tihe enlistment of a natural human sympathy... cannot be permitted to de-
ter us from performance of this duty.' In re Hansen, 318 N.W.2d 856, 858
(Minn. 1982) (per curiam) (citing In re Hanson, 103 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Minn.
1960) (per curiam)).
164. Unlike other occupational boards, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
the authority to discipline an attorney for almost any reason because "[bloth
clients and nonclients have a right to assume that lawyers will treat them
fairly and honestly in all of their dealings, whether professional or otherwise."
In re Larson, 324 N.W.2d 656, 659 (Minn. 1982) (per curiam) (quoting In re
Raskin, 239 N.W.2d 459,461 (Minn. 1976)).
165. To determine the appropriate sanctions to be levied against the attor-
ney, the Minnesota Supreme Court is "guided by prior discipline cases." In re
Hoffman, 379 N.W.2d 514,519 (Minn. 1986) (per curiam). One ADR critic has
proposed that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.4 should apply to attor-
neys practicing as mediators. See Maute, supra note 37, at 514.
166. See, e.g., Poly Software Intl v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah 1995)
(disqualifying plaintiffs attorney because of previous role as mediator in the
same suit).
167. Although a disbarred attorney will be removed from the roster of
qualified neutrals, the disbarred attorney cannot be prohibited from practic-
ing as an ADR neutral by any governmental board or private organization.
See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.12 ("The State Court Administrator shall not
place on, and shall delete from, the rosters the name of any applicant or neu-
tral whose professional license has been revoked.").
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II. A STEP FORWARD, BUT STILL LOOKING IN THE
REAR-VIEW MIRROR-THE SHORTCOMINGS OF
RULE 114'S CODE OF ETHICS
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise when-
ever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a
real loser-in fees, and expenses, and waste of time.
-Abraham Lincoln 61
Issues concerning the ethical conduct of ADR neutrals in
Minnesota did not receive considerable attention until the
early 1990s, when all Minnesota courts were directed to estab-
lish or annex ADR processes for civil proceedings. 69 In 1993,
pursuant to the statutory directives of the Minnesota Legisla-
ture authorizing "a majority of judges in a district to establish
a mandatory, non-binding arbitration program to dispose of
civil cases,"7 0 the Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated Rule
114 of the General Rules of Practice to encourage the use of
ADR.171 Rule 114 requires attorneys to consider ADR in every
civil case172 and grants to judges the discretion to order parties
168. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture (1850), in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SUPPLEMENT 1832-1865, at 18, 19
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1974).
169. See MINN. STAT. § 484.73 subd. 1 (1998) (giving the majority of the
judges of any judicial district the authority to establish "a system of manda-
tory, nonbinding arbitration within the district"); id. § 484.74 subd. 1
(authorizing the courts to order parties into non-binding ADR if the litigation
involved a claim or claims over $7,500); id. § 484.76 subd. 1 (directing the Su-
preme Court in 1991 to "establish a statewide [ADR] program for the resolu-
tion of civil cases filed with the courts"). In 1987, while concerned that
'regular citizens' were losing meaningful and timely access to the courts,"
Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the Law-
yer's Philosophical Map?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 376, 379 (1997), the
Minnesota Supreme Court and the Minnesota State Bar Association jointly
established an ADR Task Force to pursue and investigate the possibility of
forming a formal ADR program to respond to the adverse public perception
that litigation is "expensive, time consuming, slow, and intimidating." ADR
Review Board Report, supra note 26, at 2. Four years later, responding to the
findings and recommendations of the ADR Task Force, the Minnesota Legisla-
ture directed the Minnesota Supreme Court to establish a statewide ADR
program. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 484.76 subd. 1. In 1993, pursuant to the
advice and recommendations of an Implementation Committee, the Minnesota
Supreme Court promulgated Rule 114. See ADR Review Board Report, supra
note 26.
170. McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 169, at 378.
171. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.
172. Rule 114 states that "[all] civil cases are subject to Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution." After considerable debate over the issue, the ADR Task
Force recommended that the rule require mandatory consideration after ex-
amining jurisdictions that imposed a voluntary standard. See McAdoo &
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into non-binding ADR even if the one of the parties opposes
any form of ADR.173 To assist the courts, attorneys, and the
public in locating "qualified neutrals," the Minnesota Supreme
Court also promulgated a Roster of Neutrals1 74 which com-
prises two separate rosters: the Civil Neutral Roster17 5 and the
Family Law Neutral Roster.176 Accordingly, Rule 114 pre-
scribes the training, standards, qualifications, and continuing
education expectations required by each roster; these stan-
dards, however, are purposefully liberal in order to accommo-
date all professionals who wish to practice as an ADR neu-
tral.177
Because ADR processes had become an increasingly
popular and prevalent substitute for traditional litigation in
recent years,178 "it [had also become] increasingly apparent to
members of both the bench and bar that a 'Code of Ethics' con-
cerning the conduct of neutrals conducting ADR processes was
necessary."179 In pursuit of implementing standards of profes-
sional conduct for ADR neutrals, the Minnesota Supreme
Court first established the Alternative Dispute Resolution Re-
view Board,80 which, after many months of protracted research
Welsh, supra note 169, at 380. The Task Force noted that ADR was rarely if
ever used in voluntary ADR consideration jurisdictions. See id.; Minnesota
Supreme Court Minnesota State Bar Association Task Force on Alternative
Dispute Resolution, Final Report (1990).
173. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.
174. See id. Rule 114.12. Importantly, a neutral need not be a "qualified
neutral" to practice Rule 114 ADR and the parties to a Rule 114 ADR process
are free to select the presiding neutral. See id Rule 114.05(a) ("[f the par-
ties are unable to agree on a neutral... the court shall appoint the neutral.").
Additionally, the courts have the discretion, with the parties' consent, to ap-
point non-rostered neutrals "if the appointment is based on legal or other pro-
fessional training or experience" unless the ADR process is mediation or med-
arb. See id. Rule 114.05(b).
175. See id. Rule 114.12(b).
176. See id. Rule 114.12(c).
177. See id. Rule 114.13.
178. Rule 114 has been reportedly successful in reducing costs of litigation
and empaneling "qualified" ADR neutrals. See McAdoo, supra note 5, at 59-60
(reporting in a comprehensive statistical analysis supported by an ADR ques-
tionnaire that ADR, and specifically mediation, is viewed by attorneys as "a
successful settlement tool" which saves clients time and reduces litigation ex-
penses). However, McAdoo also reports that these results are only accurate to
the extent that they are based on lawyers' opinions; it remains to be seen
whether the clients share the same views.
179. Gislason & Cross, supra note 26, at 1; see also Krohnke, supra note
12, § 4-1.
180. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Review Board was originally es-
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and review, submitted a set of ethical standards to the Minne-
sota Supreme Court for its approval.18 1 Without reproach, the
Court subsequently adopted the proposal in total, 8 2 the final
product being the Code of Ethics under Rule 114.183
Members of the Minnesota ADR community have ac-
claimed the Code of Ethics as the first significant step towards
the statewide regulation of all ADR neutrals, a goal that has
yet to be established, much less achieved, in many jurisdic-
tions.184 The Code of Ethics sets forth a laudable rationale in
its introduction:
In order for ADR to be effective, there must be broad public confi-
dence in the integrity and fairness of the process. Neutrals have a
responsibility not only to the parties and to the court, but also to the
continuing improvement of ADR processes. Neutrals must observe
high standards of ethical conduct... [and the] provisions of this Code
should be construed to advance these objectives. 1u
tablished to "develop criteria for inclusion on the Court's roster of qualified
ADR neutrals." Gislason & Cross, supra note 26, at 1. In 1994, however, the
Court expanded the ADR Review Board's authority to consider the inclusion
of family law dispute resolution in Rule 114. The Board was also granted
power to consider which, if any, ethical standards should be adopted for ADR
neutrals and any continuing education requirements for qualified neutrals.
See id. The current makeup of the ADR Review Board is determined by the
Minnesota Supreme Court under Rule 114 and consists of thirteen persons
representing the following areas: a judge; a court ADR Program Director; an
ADR Sole Practitioner (one from the Twin Cities metropolitan area and one
from Greater Minnesota); a Director of a for-profit ADR organization; a Direc-
tor of a non-profit ADR organization; an attorney; and six additional family
law practitioners, including a family law judge. See ADR Review Board Re-
port, supra note 26, at 4.
181. See ADR Review Board Report, supra note 26, at 10. The Code of
Ethics has earned national attention and praise from other jurisdictions, prac-
titioners, and academics. See Kovach & Love, supra note 13 (discussing and
comparing the leading states' regulatory codes regarding mediation).
182. "Rule 114 is the product of many years of local and national experi-
ence with ADR as well as many hours of research and debate by members of
the bar, judiciary, court administration, and professionals within the field of
ADR." ADR Review Board Report, supra note 26, at 2.
183. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 144 app., Code of Ethics. The ADR Review
Board modeled the Code of Ethics after the "Joint Code" advanced by the
AAA, ABA, and SPIDR, and consulted several other codes promulgated by
other states and associations. See ADR Review Board Report, supra note 26,
at 10.
184. See, e.g., Krohnke, supra note 12, § 4-2 (noting that the Conflict Man-
agement and Dispute Resolution Section of the Minnesota Bar Association
supported and applauded the efforts of the ADR Review Board).
185. MINN. GEN. R. PRAc. 114 app., Code of Ethics, pmbl., para. 3. The
introduction further states that "It]he purpose of this code is to provide stan-
dards of ethical conduct to guide neutrals who provide ADR services, to in-
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Additionally, and unlike other professional codes of ethics, the
Code of Ethics applies to all neutrals, regardless of their pro-
fession. 8 6 The Code of Ethics also provides substantial guid-
ance to the ADR neutrals, the parties to the ADR process, and
the courts as to precisely what constitutes ADR misconduct. 187
This "breakthrough" framework of regulation is significant
considering the important role ADR neutrals play in today's
system of justice and the lack of standards of professional con-
duct controlling them.
Notwithstanding its documented successes, a88 the Code of
Ethics ultimately falls short of protecting ADR consumers pri-
marily because the Code of Ethics is both under-inclusive and
toothless.189 Although the Code of Ethics is transdisciplinary
in application, the Code is under-inclusive because it only ap-
plies to an ADR neutral if he or she is on one of the court ros-
ters; the Code of Ethics does not apply to all ADR neutrals
practicing ADR in Minnesota. 90 Most importantly, qualified
ADR neutrals are probably not subject to the Code of Ethics or
to Supreme Court disciplinary jurisdiction until a civil action is
commenced.' 9'
form and protect consumers of ADR services, and to ensure the integrity of
the various ADR processes." Id. at para. 2.
186. All ADR neutrals or ADR organizations that wish to be on one of the
court rosters are subject to the provisions and standards set forth in the Code
of Ethics.
187. The Code contains seven rules that apply to all ADR processes: Rule I,
Impartiality;, Rule 11, Conflicts of Interest; Rule I, Competence; Rule IV,
Confidentiality; Rule V, Quality of Process; Rule VI, Advertising and Solicita-
tion; and Rule VII, Fees. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAc. 114 app., Code of Ethics.
The Code also contains one rule that applies only to mediation: Rule I, Self-
Determination. See id.
188. See generally McAdoo, supra note 5.
189. See infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text; see also Letter from
Duane Krohnke, Chair, MSBA Conflict Management & Dispute Resolution
Section & Rebecca M. Picard, Ethics Committee Chair, MSBA Conflict Man-
agement & Dispute Resolution Section, to ADR Review Board 1-2 (May 13,
1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter MSBA Letter].
190. See supra note 186. Not all ADR neutrals practicing in Minnesota are
on one of the court rosters; therefore, many ADR neutrals remain essentially
unregulated.
191. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.01 ("All civil cases are subject to Alter-
native Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes, except for those actions enumer-
ated in Minn. Stat. § 484.76 and Rules 111.01 and 310.01 of these rules.").
Importantly, in Minnesota, it is sufficient to commence a civil action by serv-
ing the defendant with a summons-the plaintiff need not file the summons
with the court. See MINN. R. CIV P. 3.01(a)-(c). Consequently, parties may
practice Rule 114 ADR without the court ever being aware of the civil action.
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The Code of Ethics is also toothless because it fails to de-
fine exactly what action the Minnesota Supreme Court may
take to discipline an ADR neutral for professional miscon-
duct.9 2 The text of the Code of Ethics ambiguously states that
"[f]ailure to comply with any provision... may be the basis for
removal from the roster of neutrals maintained by the Office of
the State Court Administrator and/or for such other action as
may be taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court."193 Accord-
ingly, ADR neutrals (and the Minnesota Supreme Court) have
little, if any, idea what professional sanctions they may face if
they violate one of the Code's Rules 194 (especially considering
that ADR neutrals continue to enjoy qualified civil immunity
for any violation of the Code of Ethics). 9 5 Similarly, the Code
of Ethics lacks the procedural and due process guidelines and
an enforcement mechanism necessary to take any action
against one of the "qualified" neutrals. 196 One attorney and
ADR practitioner has noted that the Code fails to provide ex-
plicit "exit" rules for attorney ADR neutrals from the Rules and
"entrance" rules to the ethical standards of Rule 114 that ad-
dress the kind of ethical issues that are unique to ADR proc-
esses. 9 7 Thus, the Code falls to indicate whether attorneys
and non-attorneys will be disciplined under the Code of Ethics
in addition to other professional codes of conduct (such as the
MRPC). Finally, the Code of Ethics does not address other
substantial issues such as whether the complaints, complain-
ants, and results of the investigative process should be confi-
dential or public 9 8 Therefore, considering these criticisms, it
is apparent that the Code of Ethics, like the other professional
standards of conduct, not only falls to provide adequate guid-
192. See MNhN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., Code of Ethics, pmbl., para. 6 (de-
fining ambiguously the disciplinary measures the Court may take against a
"qualified neutral").
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. See supra note 187 (listing the specific Rules under the Code of Eth-
ics).
195. The Code of Ethics specifically states that "fvliolation of a provision of
this Code shall not create a cause of action nor shall it create any presump-
tion that a legal duty has been breached. Nothing in this Code should be
deemed to establish or augment any substantive legal duty on the part of neu-
trals." MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., Code of Ethics, pmbl., para. 6; cf. supra
notes 76-77 and accompanying text (regarding common law and statutory
ADR neutral civil immunity).
196. See MSBA Letter, supra note 189, at 1-2.
197. See Krohnke, supra note 12, § 4-2.
198. See MSBA Letter, supra note 189.
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ance to ADR neutrals, but inadequately protects the ADR con-
sumer from neutral misconduct.199
III. MANAGING THE ADR MOMENTUM IN THE NEXT
MILLENNIUM: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST
IN TE ADR ETHICAL SYSTEM
I find the most important thing in the world is not so much where we
stand as in what direction we are moving.
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 2u
A. A SIMPLE MATTER OF TRUST: WHY ADR ETHICS ARE
DESIRABLE
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that ADR neu-
trals (whether they are rostered neutrals, licensed profession-
als, members of private ADR organizations, or laypersons)
practice in an unregulated market-free from universal, uni-
form, and enforceable standards of conduct.20' This Note pre-
supposes that ADR ethics is both a professional and philo-
sophical goal worth pursuing.202 Nevertheless, to buttress the
persuasive weight of this Note, a succinct justification for uni-
199. The ADR Review Board is not oblivious to most of these defects. In
fact, the Board has recommended that the Supreme Court establish an en-
forcement mechanism for the Code of Ethics and has asked for the court's
guidance on several other issues including due process, confidentiality, and
procedural issues surrounding the discipline of ADR neutrals under Rule 114.
See ADR Review Board, Procedure Governing Complaints Against Neutrals
and the Code of Ethics Governing Neutrals (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author). But the recommendations have come under considerable criti-
cism from the Minnesota State Bar Association and other organizations and
as of the date of this Note have yet to be adopted by the Supreme Court. But
even if the proposed procedure is adopted, it would still substantively fail in
universally regulating all ADR neutrals and protecting ADR consumers. See
supra notes 188-98 (noting the "under-inclusiveness" of the Code of Ethics).
200. OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE 82
(1955), quoted in Jacquelyn H. Slotkin, An Institutional Comment to Minori-
ties and Diversity: The Evolution of a Law School Academic Program, T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 559, 592 (1995).
201. Of course, one could make the argument that the market simply
would not support unethical ADR practices. The analysis and criticism of a
market theory is beyond the scope of this Note.
202. Arguably, if the goal were not worth pursuing then the Code of Ethics
and countless other ADR codes of professional conduct established by courts
as well as those produced by organizations-such as the AAA and SPDR-
would never have been promulgated, and professional and academic discourse
on the subject would not be as substantial as it is today.
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versal and uniform rules of ADR professional conduct bears
brief mention.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
effectiveness and success of any ADR process depends on
whether the public is confident that the process is both honest
and fair.203 When broken down, this core concept becomes a
simple matter of trust-the public must trust the ADR process
for it to succeed. Accordingly, the public must trust the ADR
neutral because of the pivotal position the neutral plays in the
outcome of the process. 20 4 As one critic has noted, however, "to
trust and entrust is to become vulnerable and dependent on
the good will and motivations of those we trust,"205 and indeed,
the public is vulnerable to ADR misconduct. The relationship
between a neutral and the parties to the dispute resolution
process is a special and sensitive one, like that between a doc-
tor and her patient or a lawyer and his client; it entails a level
of trust and a unique ethical dimension not present in ordinary
relationships. 206 In accordance with this understanding, we
must be concerned with how to develop this trust.
Generally speaking, trust in any relationship is earned
and developed through acts of goodwill over time.207 This is not
always true, though, in the case of relationships between pro-
fessionals and their clients or customers. In these cases, trust
may be founded either in the system as a whole or, ideally, in a
combination of both the system and the character of the indi-
vidual professional. 208 Where professional relationships can be
203. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., Code of Ethics, pmbl.
204. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 408-09 (noting that neutrals,
or "solution maximizers," play significant roles in ADR and have created new
ethical problems because of their unique roles as neutrals).
205. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Trust and Distrust in Professional Ethics, in
ETHICS, TRUST, AND THE PROFESSIONS: PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL
ASPECTS 69 (Edmund D. Pellegrino et al. eds., 1991).
206. See generally Robert Sokolowski, The Fiduciary Relationship and the
Nature of Professionalism, in ETHICS, TRUST, AND THE PROFESSIONS:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS, supra note 205, at 23-39 (examining
professional trust in the context of a fiduciary relationship).
207. See Pellegrino, supra note 205, at 72-73. Pellegrino compares the
kind of trust we place in absolute strangers, the "reliance" or "system trust"
that we place in airline pilots, police, and fireman, and the kind of trust
placed in other professionals, such as doctors and attorneys, which tends to be
of a more personal nature because of the freedom involved in choosing the re-
lationship with these professionals. Id.
208. Id. at 73. For example, we trust airline pilots not for who they are but
for the job they do, because presumably their motives and self-interest coin-
cide with our own wishes-namely, to takeoff, fly, and land the aircraft safely.
[Vol. 83:18391882
ADR NEUTRAL REGULATION
formed through consultation, research, and advice (unlike the
paradigmatic pilot-passenger relationship), the system is able
to establish or reinforce trust.209 Essentially, this Note has
shown that while there are a few "systems" that work to estab-
lish trust in ADR (such as the Code of Ethics or private ADR
professional standards), these "systems" do very little to rein-
force the trust because they are under-inclusive, unenforceable,
and/or toothless.210 Therefore, the development of an effective
"system" becomes a simple matter of readjusting the currently
maladjusted ADR system211 by establishing the Rules of ADR
Neutral Professional Conduct.212
B. DEFINING THE PARAMETERS OF ADR ETHICS WITHIN THE
CURRENT "SYSTEM": ESTABLISHING THE BOARD OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION To ENFORCE THE RULES OF ADR
NEUITRAL PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Any attempt to define the parameters of an ADR ethical
system should not be done "in space" or on a tabula rasa. It
would simply be counterproductive to redefine the professional
responsibilities of ADR neutrals and repeal the statutory and
common law rules regarding ADR neutral liability and ac-
countability.2 3 Correspondingly, this Note does not criticize
nor suggest modifications to the ethical rules or Code of Ethics,
which already provide a competent and comprehensible
framework regarding the duties and responsibilities of ADR
neutrals.214 Moreover, both the legislature and the courts have
made it quite clear that neutrals shall enjoy qualified civil im-
munity, and they have justified this legal determination with
valid rationale and sound public policy.215 Accordingly, this
This "system trust" exists because "we recognize a certain amount of trust in
the system of education, credentialing, and the process of licensure." Id.
209. See id.
210. See discussion supra Parts I-il.
211. See discussion supra Parts I-II.
212. This Note contemplates generally a comprehensive set of universal
standards of ADR professional conduct, the "Rules of Neutral ADR Profes-
sional Conduct," which will be uniformly applied to all ADR neutrals practic-
ing ADR in Minnesota, regardless of professional background. While this
Note does not discuss or define the substance of these uniform rules, it adopts
the substance of Rule 114's Code of Ethics and contemplates its universal and
uniform application.
213. See supra notes 77-79.
214. See generally MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 app., Code of Ethics, Rules I-
VII.
215. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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Note will not debate the theoretical but improbable option of
changing the law and holding ADR neutrals civilly liable for
professional misconduct.216 Rather, the system should be con-
structed based on the solid foundation already provided by the
courts and legislature. Therefore, if the current system of ADR
ethics must be predicated upon qualified civil immunity,217
public trust will best be developed by promulgating universal
and uniform rules of ADR professional conduct and establish-
ing an exclusive board entrusted with the authority to enforce
them with appropriate disciplinary measures. 218
Regulating work performance through disciplinary con-
trols customarily entails some form of a professional licensing
scheme.21 9 The primary component of any licensing scheme is
216. As ADR neutral misconduct becomes more prevalent, the aggrieved
parties will pursue other theories of recovery, including express and implied
warranties based on any agreement the parties may sign with the neutral
prior to the ADR process, such as an "Agreement to Mediate," which defines
the process and outlines each party's obligations during the process. See
MINN. STAT. §§ 336.2-.314, 336.2-.315 (regarding implied warranties). How-
ever, recovery under these theories is improbable because the Minnesota
courts have declined to "extend the implied warranty/strict liability doctrine
to cover vendors of professional services." City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi,
263 N.W.2d 420, 425 (Minm. 1978); accord LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon,
Inc. 660 F.2d 342, 346 n.6 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that "[tihe implied war-
ranty provisions of [the Minnesota statutes]... apply only to the sale of
goods, not the sale of services"); Wells v. 10-X Mfg. Co., 609 F.2d 248, 254 (8th
Cir. 1979).
217. Theoretically, politically, and philosophically, before choosing to
regulate an occupation through legal codes of professional conduct, the legis-
lature or other body must first consider whether "we really want professional
conduct to be legally regulated beyond the statutes already in place for negli-
gence, fraud, breaches of contract, and similar misdeeds of citizens in gen-
eral." JOHN KULTGEN, ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM 249 (1988). This ques-
tion clearly need not be asked, much less answered, because ADR neutrals are
not regulated by law or statute-at least that is the position this Note takes.
See generally supra notes 76-77 (regarding statutory and common law civil
immunity).
218. Unlike traditional remedies such as malpractice and breach of fiduci-
ary duties, discipline is a remedy for professional incompetence and failure.
See STEPHEN GILLERS & NORMAN DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 287 (2d ed. 1989). Civil actions are brought by
a person or an entity who makes the decision whether they should settle the
conflict or pursue it in court. See id. Criminal actions are brought by the
state. See id. Discipline, on the other hand, vindicates the public interest in
preventing unethical behavior-its purpose is not to provide a remedy to the
particular individual injured by the misconduct, although it may have this ef-
fect. See id.
219. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Rethinking Barriers to Legal Practice, 81
JuDIcATuRE 100, 102 (1997).
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a mechanism to identify, investigate and prosecute possible
professional misconduct "and impos[e] disciplinary sanctions
upon proof that problems are real."220 Additionally, the proce-
dural and disciplinary measures must be based upon specific
standards to guide both the disciplinary body and the ADR
neutrals.221 As previously noted, the legislature has used its
discretion to establish numerous agencies or boards that over-
see the regulation of several occupations. 222 But whereas most
licensed professions and occupations are regulated and disci-
plined by executive agencies established by the legislature, it is
equally the case in some states, including Minnesota, that the
state Supreme Court is vested with the authority to "license"
and regulate "officers of the court," including lawyers, and now
some ADR neutrals.223 This interdisciplinary confusion and
overlapping authority of the branches of government (poten-
tially, the executive branch via an administrative agency with
legislatively-delegated powers and the judicial branch regu-
lating court-annexed ADR) foreshadows two inseparable and
foreseeable issues-whether the legislature will utilize its con-
stitutional authority to license ADR neutrals, and whether the
judiciary will take jurisdictional exception to the legislative ac-
tion under the separation of powers doctrine. 224
At the threshold level, proponents of an exclusive Board of
Alternative Dispute Resolution should have little difficulty ar-
guing that the "unregulated practice of [ADRI may harm or en-
danger the health, safety, and welfare of citizens of the state"
and that "the potential for harm is recognizable and not re-
mote."225 As the public justice system evolves into the twenty-
first century, we must take a look around and recognize "that
220. Id
221. See, e.g., supra notes 134-35 (noting the occupation boards' power to
enact and enforce rules governing the respective licensees and generally dis-
cussing some of these rules).
222. See supra note 119.
223. See Kritzer, supra note 219, at 102-03.
224. Scholars and the ADR Review Board have alluded to the potential
power struggle between the judiciary and legislature concerning which branch
will be and should be vested with the authority to regulate and discipline ADR
practitioners. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 412 (asserting that the
regulation of ADR presents jurisdictional questions on two levels). The initial
level is "[first, what professional body will oversee ethical regulation-is ADR
ethics regulation the sole province of lawyers (implicating the controversial
question of whether ADR is the practice of law) or should we hope to share
transdisciplinary regulation with other professions."
225. MINN. STAT. § 214.001 subd. 2(a) (1998).
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[ADRI as a substitute for court-based litigation is growing in
appeal"226 and that ADR "recapitulates many of the issues of
American jurisprudence."227 For these and several other rea-
sons, many critics have cautiously attempted to apply the
brakes to the ADR movement in order to at least gauge how
ADR is transforming the practice of law.228 This transforma-
tion or movement necessarily affects the welfare of the citizens
of any state because the "principal function of our legal system
is to provide fair and just results to the individual disputants
and to society;"22 9 and whereas myriad rules of law and codes of
ethics have been promulgated to protect society by defining the
appropriate behavior within the legal system,23 0 this is not the
case within the ADR system.231 Therefore, because ADR cir-
cumvents the safeguards of the legal system, including the
rules that protect the public from unethical practices, 232 the
regulation of ADR neutrals is of utmost concern not only to the
integrity and fairness of the ADR system, but also to society in
general.
It is also evident from the various agency and court rules
that "the practice of ADR requires specialized skill or training"
and that the "public will benefit by assurances of initial and
continuing occupational ability."233 Several statutes require
the neutrals practicing under them to be trained and/or quali-
fied before they may be placed on a roster,234 and many ADR
experts are beginning to define the special skills and qualifica-
tions it takes to practice as an ADR neutral.235 Similarly, al-
though the ADR Review Board has taken the position that
ADR neutral qualifications should be modest, the fact remains
that the ADR Review Board will not consider a neutral to be
"qualified" unless the minimum standards are met.236 Moreo-
226. Feerick, supra note 34, at 456.
227. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12, at 415.
228. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 10, at 1373.
229. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 489.
230. See, e.g., supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
231. See discussion supra Parts I-.
232. See supra note 10 (discussing the constitutional concerns posed by
ADR).
233. MmNN. STAT. § 214.001 subd. 2(b) (1998).
234. See, e.g., MINN. R. 5530.0600-.0800 (1997) (defining the arbitrator
qualifications, roster appointments, and arbitrator conduct and standards).
235. See, e.g., Devine, supra note 38, at 189-92 (discussing the relevant
skills and training requirements of a mediator).
236. See MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.13(a)-(e) (defining training, standards,
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ver, other state courts have established more stringent certifi-
cation and qualifications for ADR neutrals practicing in their
jurisdictions and the ADR Review Board has advised the Min-
nesota Supreme Court to adopt continuing education require-
ments for "qualified neutrals."23 7 This trend is probative of the
fact that ADR experts believe that it is beneficial for neutrals
to continue to hone their skills and awareness of their ethical
obligations as professional ADR neutrals, regardless of their
professional background.
A definitive answer to the final two prongs of the four-part
test under the OLA, specifically "[wlhether the citizens of this
state are or may be effectively protected by other means" 238 and
"[wlhether the overall cost effectiveness and economic impact
would be positive for citizens of the state, 239 is somewhat be-
yond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, as to the third
prong, this Note has demonstrated and contended that the cur-
rent "system" of ADR ethics does not sufficiently protect the
public.240 And indeed, one need not be an economist to discern
that both money and time will necessarily be saved if all of the
separate boards currently "regulating" ADR neutrals are con-
solidated into one body vested with the exclusive authority to
regulate all ADR practices and neutrals. Thus, considering the
criteria set forth in the OLA, despite the lack of empirical evi-
dence establishing the economic need and benefits of ADR
regulation, it can be soundly argued that the legislature would
be justified in determining that the public will benefit from the
uniform licensure and regulation of ADR neutrals.
C. THE COLLISION COURSE: JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT AND
COMPROMISE-WHICH BRANCH WILL REGULATE ADR
NEUTRALS?
The challenge of establishing the exclusive Board of ADR
does not end with the conclusion that it can be achieved under
the OLA. On the contrary, the state government must first
make the jurisdictional determination of which political branch
will ultimately regulate ADR neutrals in Minnesota-the leg-
and qualifications for "qualified" ADR neutrals).
237. See id. Rule 114.13(g).
238. MINN. STAT. § 214.001 subd. 2(c); see supra notes 127-30 and accom-
panying text (providing background and excerpting the text of the Occupa-
tional Licensing Act).
239. Id. § 214.001 subd. 2(d).
240. See discussion supra Parts I-H.
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islature, the executive (as an administrative agency), the judi-
ciary, or some cooperative effort of all branches? And if the
branches promulgate conflicting rules regulating ADR neu-
trals, which rules should control?
As previously mentioned, the Minnesota Constitution does
not explicitly bestow upon the judiciary the authority to regu-
late its courts and judicial officers. 241 The Minnesota Constitu-
tion, however, expressly separates the powers of government
into three distinct branches, vesting the judicial power exclu-
sively with the Supreme Court.242 Taken in conjunction, these
constitutional provisions are the source of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's inherent powers,243 which will undoubtedly play
a significant part in the establishment of the Board of ADR.
The Minnesota Supreme Court may threaten the success
of the legislative act establishing an exclusive Board of ADR by
declaring the act unconstitutional, but only if the court chooses
to contest the act as a clear usurpation of the Court's inherent
powers.244 Although the Minnesota Supreme Court rarely ex-
ercises these inherent powers in this way, it has intermittently
done so to preserve its control over the bar, court procedure,
and the practice of law.245 Accordingly, the Court will likely be
very protective of its current regulatory role with respect to
ADR neutrals and standards of ADR conduct, and might in-
voke its inherent powers to protect that role.
Due to the unique nature of ADR neutrals 246 and the lack
of governing caselaw,247 it is difficult to play out and predict the
outcome of this imminent jurisdictional conflict. Nonetheless,
the legislature must not overlook the Minnesota Supreme
Court's inherent powers in this area. An initial concern is
whether the Court possesses the exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate all attorney-neutrals qua attorneys248 and all "quali-
fied" ADR neutrals if they violate one of the provisions of the
Code of Ethics during a court-annexed ADR proceeding be-
241. See supra note 144.
242. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
243. See id.
244. See supra notes 143-44.
245. See supra note 150 (discussing the Minnesota Supreme Court's
authority to regulate the practice of law).
246. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
247. See cases cited supra notes 147-50.
248. See cases cited supra notes 147-50.
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cause the neutral is practicing with the Court's permission and
within its jurisdiction.24 9
Furthermore, the judiciary may be able to establish that it
has the authority to regulate all ADR proceedings and neutrals
by finding that ADR is equivalent to the practice of law,250 an
area over which the Court has exclusive regulatory jurisdic-
tion.251 Finally, assuming that the judiciary will defend its cur-
rent dominion over court-annexed ADR252 and other dispute
resolution programs, 253 the Court could attempt to defeat any
usurpation of that power on the basis that the Court has al-
ready promulgated rules governing ADR neutrals,2 4 and any
modification or elimination of those rules would violate the
separation of powers doctrine. 255
Therefore, in light of this possible jurisdictional conflict
and the uncertainty of its outcome, it is in the best interests of
the government, ADR neutrals, and the public for the three
branches to work cooperatively towards establishing an exclu-
sive Board of Alternative Dispute Resolution that will univer-
sally enforce uniform rules of ADR conduct.256 This endeavor
can be accomplished by establishing the Board of ADR as part
of the judiciary with the Governor appointing the members of
the Board with the advice and consent of the Senate;25 7 alter-
249. See supra notes 169, 172-77 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's authority over ADR processes).
250. See supra note 149 (discussing whether ADR is the practice of law).
251. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 494.01 subds. 1-2 (establishing the statewide
community dispute resolution program, which is administered by the State
Court Administrator). The State Court Administrator serves at the pleasure
of the Minnesota Supreme Court. See supra note 151.
254. See, e.g., supra note 149 (discussing the legislature's ability to pass a
statute regulating the practice of law so long as it does not infringe upon an
area already governed by court rule).
255. See supra note 149.
256. See supra notes 123-24, 129 (describing the legislature's establish-
ment of administrative boards and rules).
257. The idea of vesting the Board of ADR in the judiciary is based upon
the Board on Judicial Standards, "an independent state agency that investi-
gates allegations of ethical misconduct by Minnesota judges and referees."
DEPARTMENT OF ADmINISTRATION, MINNESOTA GUIDEBOOK TO STATE AGENCY
SERVICES 1996-1999, at 368 (Robin PanLener ed., 8th ed. 1996); see MINN.
STAT. § 490.15 subd. 1 (1998) (establishing the Board on Judicial Standards
and defining the membership as appointed by the Governor to include "one
judge of the court of appeals, three trial court judges, two lawyers who have
practiced law in the state for ten years and four citizens who are not judges,"
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natively, the legislature could establish the Board of ADR like
any other administrative agency,25 8 but with a membership
that includes judicial officers such as judges and attorneys.25 9
Regardless of which branch the Board of ADR ultimately rests
in, the Board should look forward to being advised by both
ADR experts and members of the public through an advisory
task force260 created to investigate and ultimately advise the
Board on the immediate and primary objectives making the
regulation of ADR neutrals as simple and uniform as possi-
ble.261
all of whom are appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Senate ex-
cept for the non-judicial members); In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785, 807 (Minn.
1978) (upholding statute establishing the Board on Judicial Standards as a
constitutional delegation of power to the judiciary).
258. See, e.g., supra notes 119, 123-24 (discussing administrative agencies).
259. The constitutionality of this arrangement remains to be seen; how-
ever, it probably can be structured to avoid state constitutional conflicts. See
generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (stating that
the legislative delegation of the power to create sentencing guidelines to a ju-
dicial agency "pose[d] no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial
Branch or of expanding the powers of the Judiciary beyond constitutional
bounds by uniting within the Branch the political or quasi-legislative power of
the Commission with the judicial power of the courts"); Cahill v. Beltrami
County, 29 N.W.2d 444, 446 (Minn. 1947) (upholding under the separation of
powers doctrine the legislative delegation of authority to the district courts to
conduct de novo review of determination by county board of sheriffs salary
because the sheriff is a quasi-judicial officer); Koochiching County Taxes State
v. Koochiching Realty Co., 177 N.W. 940 (Minn. 1920).
260. Pursuant to the legislature's policy "to encourage state agencies to
solicit and receive advice from members of the public," advisory task forces
are created to render advice to state agencies or boards regarding appropriate
subjects. MNN. STAT. § 15.014 subds. 1-2. An advisory task force is defined
as "[a] committee or council scheduled upon its creation to expire two years
after the effective date of the act creating it or the date of appointment of its
members, whichever is later, unless a shorter term is specified in statute." Id.
§ 15.012(f). The joint advisory task force contemplated by this Note is a
"council" composed of ADR experts including lawyers, judges, professionals,
and laypersons, much like the membership of the current ADR Review Board,
and will be referred to as the Joint ADR Review Council (JADRRC), which is
conveniently pronounced "Jade Rock." Compare id. § 15.012(c) (defining a
council as a "committee of which at least one-half of the members are required
to be certain officers or representatives of specified businesses, occupations,
industries, political subdivisions, organizations, or other groupings of persons
other than geographical regions"), with ADR Review Board Report, supra note
26, at 4 (defining the membership of the ADR Review Board). See generally
MINN. STAT. § 15.059 (outlining the terms, compensation, and removal of
members of advisory councils and committees, including advisory task forces).
261. See KULTGEN, supra note 217, at 212 (stating that standards of pro-
fessional conduct are most effective when they are "simple and plausible to a
wide audience").
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The membership of the Joint ADR Review Council
(JADRRC) and the Board of ADR will be crucial to the quality
and open-mindedness of the discussion, recommendations, and
rules governing ADR conduct.262 Much like the current ADR
Review Board and other occupational licensing boards, the
members of JADRRC should include experienced ADR practi-
tioners from varying professional backgrounds, including law-
yers, judges, and professionals in other disciplines commonly
involved in ADR processes. 263 Appointments should also take
into account geographical representation so that the public is
ensured statewide representation. 264
It will also be very important for JADRRC to consider, and
the Board of ADR to establish, training and eligibility stan-
dards, rules of professional conduct, investigative and discipli-
nary procedures, and sanctions that provide both due process
to the neutral and ultimate protection to the public.265 Similar
to the "market approach" employed by the current ADR Review
Board,266 the eligibility standards for ADR neutrals can be
relatively modest so that the public and the neutrals have
broad discretion in selecting the ADR process as well as the
neutral. On the other hand, the ethical rules must be explicit
and rigorously enforced. The Code of Ethics provides a valu-
able framework for JADRRC,to study and for the Board of ADR
to emulate and improve.267
After JADRRC has had an appropriate amount of time to
investigate and make its recommendations, 268 the permanent
and exclusive Board of ADR shall establish procedures to hear
complaints and implement and enforce substantive rules with
disciplinary sanctions, which will uniformly apply to all neu-
262. See supra notes 123, 136 and accompanying text (discussing the
membership of boards and the authority to prescribe rules).
263. See supra note 180 (describing the membership of the ADR Review
Board).
264. See supra note 169 (discussing the ADR Task Force's recommendation
for statewide representation).
265. See supra note 123 (noting that occupational boards have the author-
ity to revoke licenses and make rules governing their respective professions);
supra note 130 (noting the need to consider the skills and training standards
of an occupation).
266. See ADR Task Force Report, supra note 172.
267. See supra note 187 (providing the seven rules under the Code of Eth-
ics that apply to all ADR processes).
268. See supra note 260 (noting the two-year existence of advisory task
forces).
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trals practicing in Minnesota-the Rules of ADR Neutral Pro-
fessional Conduct. Consequently, the Board of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and the Rules of ADR Neutral Professional
Conduct will develop the public trust necessary for ADR to suc-
ceed in the next millennium and beyond.
CONCLUSION
Just as quickly as we approach the twenty-first century,
the ADR movement is expeditiously gaining momentum from
increasing government and consumer support. Alarmingly,
ADR neutrals from diverse professional backgrounds and areas
of expertise generally practice with guaranteed civil immunity
and little, if any, public accountability. Although there is a
strong consensus that ADR requires distinct professional stan-
dards of conduct, a consensus has not been reached as to how
these standards should be regulated and who will enforce
them. By establishing an exclusive Board of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution to enforce a relaxed licensing scheme including
the Rules of ADR Neutral Professional Conduct, Minnesota
will provide valuable guidance not only to the ADR neutrals
practicing statewide, but to other jurisdictions who will look to
Minnesota as the prime mover in the twenty-first century ADR
ethical system. Most importantly, in addition to protecting the
public with consistent enforcement of uniform standards of
ADR conduct, the Board of Alternative Dispute Resolution will
develop the public trust the ADR movement depends on for its
integrity and ultimate success.
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